University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Court Review: The Journal of the American
Judges Association

American Judges Association

Winter 2007

Court Review: Volume 43, Issue 4 – Complete Issue

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons

"Court Review: Volume 43, Issue 4 – Complete Issue" (2007). Court Review: The Journal of the American
Judges Association. 238.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview/238

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal of
the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln.

Court Review
Volume 43, Issue 4

T H E

J O U R N A L

O F

T H E

A M E R I C A N

J U D G E S

A S S O C I A T I O N

A Judge’s Guide
To Using Social Science
Mental Illness in Court
Neuroscience and
Batterer Intervention
Revisiting Branzburg

Court Review

Volume 43, Issue 4

T H E

J O U R N A L

O F

T H E

A M E R I C A N

T A B L E
EDITORS
Judge Steve Leben
Kansas Court of Appeals

O F

J U D G E S

C O N T E N T S

ARTICLES
156

A Judges’ Guide to Social Science

Professor Alan Tomkins
University of Nebraska
ASSISTANTS TO THE EDITOR
Kimberly Applequist
University of Nebraska

A S S O C I A T I O N

John Monahan & Laurens Walker

164

Rachel Sharpe
Kansas Court of Appeals

Mental Illness and the Courts:
Some Reflections on Judges as Innovators
John P. Petrila & Allison D. Redlich

EDITORIAL BOARD
Judge B. Michael Dann
National Institute of Justice

178

Cautions About Applying Neuroscience to Batterer Intervention

Julie Kunce Field
Fort Collins, Colorado

Edward Gondolf

Professor Philip P. Frickey
University of California at Berkeley
Mark D. Hinderks
Overland Park, Kansas

182

Breaking News:
Miller is Distinguishable from Branzburg
Levon Q. Schlichter

Judge Leslie G. Johnson
American Institute for Justice
Professor Steven Lubet
Northwestern University
Judge Gregory E. Mize
Washington, D.C.
Elizabeth Neeley, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska
C. Robert Showalter, M.D.
Harrisonburg, Virginia
Professor Charles H. Whitebread
University of Southern California

NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS STAFF
Charles F. Campbell
Managing Editor

DEPARTMENTS
154

Editor’s Note

155

President’s Column

196

The Resource Page

Court Review
T H E

J O U R N A L

O F

T H E

A M E R I C A N

J U D G E S

Volume 43, Issue 4

EDITOR’S NOTE

D

ivorce cases were part of my docket when I began my judicial career.
I was single then and had not had children. I quickly faced lots of situations well beyond my experience: a breast-feeding mother who

wanted the father’s visitation limited to four hours in her presence each week,
a parent who wanted t o move across the country with the child, or even a dispute about parent-child access in a “typical” divorce. In the absence of expert
testimony, could I look anywhere for answers other than court decisions that

may—or may not—have been based on sound research?
I looked into this question and discovered the work of two Virginia law
professors, John Monahan and Laurens Walker. Their original 1991 article on
this subject (in a journal not readily available
to most judges) continues even today to be
cited by courts. See Baxter v. Temple, ___ A.2d
___, 2008 Westlaw 2097123 at n.1 (N.H. May
20, 2008). Monahan and Walker have refined
their work over the years since 1991, and I’m
proud that they have prepared a thoroughly
updated version of their 1991 article especially for Court Review. Judges in trial and
appellate courts regularly rule on issues that
are significantly impacted by social-science
information. Monahan and Walker discuss
when and how we may take that substantial body of information into account
in contested cases. Their work represents an important contribution to effective judicial decision-making.
This issue contains two additional articles that demonstrate the importance
of social-science information in court. John Petrila and Allison Redlich discuss strategies that have been used in mental-health courts to reduce recidivism by defendants with mental illness. They also discuss ways in which
judges in these courts are involved in what some view as nontraditional roles
for judges.
Specialized courts like mental-health courts and domestic-violence courts
rely upon judicial training regarding background social-science information
like mental illness so that judges may more effectively deal with the situations
confronting us. Ed Gondolf presents information of this sort that a judge
handling a domestic-violence case might want to consider. Specifically, he
suggests that some who have specific mental illnesses may not be helped by
traditional battterer-intervention programs often ordered by judges. We can
be better judges by being better-informed judges. The mission of Court
Review is to help you to be that type of judge.—Steve Leben
154 Court Review - Volume 43
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President’s Column
Eileen Olds

I can hardly believe that I am halfway through my term as

credibility to call on the expertise and assistance of others. I

your president. Time really does fly when you’re having fun!

am convinced that collaborative efforts are a necessary hall-

Fun I have had, but more importantly, I have had the opportu-

mark of this organization. Collective resources and informa-

nity to represent this prestigious, premier organization of

tion sharing of trends and best practices—as they emerge—

judges in many different venues. As an organization, we are

keep us on the cutting edge. All of us should be grateful for

addressing critical issues facing our judiciary. With our initia-

the partnerships we enjoy with such organizations as Justice

tives, such as our “Tell It to the Judge” project, we are also

at Stake, the National Judicial College, the National

examining those issues relevant to the public that we serve.

Association of Women Judges, the National Bar Judicial

Through it all, I have been proud to witness the stature that

Council, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court

AJA enjoys all over the country.

Judges, the Conference of Chief Judges, the Conference of

Just recently, I had the fascinating opportunity to participate

State Court Administrators, the National Association for Court

in a roundtable discussion in partnership with the Bureau of

Management, and for the immeasurable assistance given by

Justice Assistance and the Center for Court

the National Center for State Courts, among

Innovation regarding the future of problem-solv-

others.

ing courts. Problem-solving courts take many

In closing, let me take this opportunity to wel-

forms: drug courts, mental-health courts, prosti-

come some of you in advance, and to invite oth-

tution courts, housing courts, and domestic-vio-

ers of you to our 2008 annual education confer-

lence courts, to name a few. We took a critical

ence. This is where much of the collaboration

look at the successes as well as the challenges

ignites. It is at our meetings that collegiality is

encountered in these specialized courts. At the

also at work. Our well planned and well exe-

forefront was the discussion of whether statewide

cuted annual meetings allow members, their fam-

coordination should be implemented. That is

ilies, and guests to become familiar with those

perhaps something we all should deliberate about as the need

who they otherwise would never meet. The conference allows

for such courts continues to grow. As individual judges, we are

for an exchange of ideas and as a foundation for life-long affil-

all problem-solvers. Our inclusion as a participant is but one

iations: Collaboration and Collegiality. Our meetings are a

example of how AJA benefits from its recognition as an organi-

distinct opportunity to renew old friendships and to make new

zation “of judges, for judges, by judges.” When and where sig-

ones. They allow each of us to reach out to other judges to dis-

nificant discussions are being held, we are at the table.

cuss common concerns; or to just catch up on what is going on

As the “Voice of the Judiciary,” we are not only speaking, but

in each other’s lives. Even with our differences, we are united

we are being heard. At every turn, newspapers, respected legal

in our common bond—our profession. I know that there are

journals, and scholarly publications seek our input. Other

those of us, like me, who have not missed an annual conference

judicial organizations are joining forces with us to make our

once we started. We were hooked from the start. For those of

judicial system all that it should be. Whether it is convening

you who have put it off, give it a try. Mark your calendars!!

with other judicial officers at their meetings and conferences,

Maui, Hawaii, awaits you. What better time or location to get

or answering calls and emails on topics of concern to others,

acquainted with what AJA has to offer? You won’t want to miss

collaboration is necessary. The old adage, “It’s not just what

it!

you know, but who you know,” is applicable to the relation-

renewed to forge ahead in this most honorable profession. I

ships we have been afforded.

look forward to seeing you.

I promise you will leave well-educated, revived, and

Because of our rich history, we are fortunate to have the
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A Judges’ Guide to
Using Social Science

*

John Monahan & Laurens Walker

S

ince the first glimmerings of legal realism early in this
century, American courts have been remarkably open to
using social science research when that research could
help resolve empirical issues that arise in litigation.
Increasingly in recent decades, courts have sought out research
data on their own when the parties have failed to provide
them. Social scientists, for their part, are investigating questions of judicial interest at an accelerating pace. In this article,
we examine the three principal uses that courts have found for
social science research.1 For each use, we review early and current approaches to dealing with social science in court. We
conclude by offering judges a step-by-step guide to incorporating social science research in cases that call for a determination of empirical issues.
Social science research was first urged upon an American
court in 1908 by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon,2 a landmark case dealing with the constitutionality of social welfare
legislation limiting the work day of any female employed in a
factory or laundry to ten hours. Brandeis assembled a substantial body of medical and social science research tending to
show the debilitating effect on women and girls of working
long hours, and presented this material to the United States
Supreme Court in a brief defending Oregon’s limits on the
number of hours females could be employed. In the opinion in
Muller upholding the legislation, after referring to the social
science materials in a lengthy footnote, the Court stated that
although they “may not be, technically speaking, authorities,”3
the studies would nonetheless receive “judicial cognizance.”4
Although the use of what came to be known as “Brandeis
briefs” became common in the years after Muller, legal commentators were hard pressed to explain an apparent anomaly:
How was it that Brandeis could present research to an appellate
court in a written brief, when “facts” were supposed to be
introduced at the trial level by the oral testimony of witnesses?
This conundrum persisted until the late Kenneth Culp Davis,
in a seminal article published in 1942, distinguished two types

* A version of this article was originally published as John Monahan
and Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research. 15 LAW
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 571 (1991). It is reprinted with the kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media, and has been thoroughly updated for COURT REVIEW.
Footnotes
1. Many of the cases discussed here can be found in John MONAHAN
& LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW].
2. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
3. Id. at 420.
4. Id. at 421.
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of “fact.”5 The first type, legislative fact, referred to facts that
were used by courts to help decide broad questions of law or
policy, as Brandeis had used research to help decide the constitutionality of social welfare legislation. The second type,
adjudicative fact, referred to facts that were used to decide
questions of interest only to the specific parties to a lawsuit,
such as whether a particular traffic light was red or green.
Davis’s distinction soon became widely accepted and now
forms the traditional scheme used by courts and commentators
to describe the judicial uses of social science.6 As the following
sections make clear, Davis’s concepts have been severely criticized in recent years and may well have outlived their usefulness as tools for managing the introduction of empirical information in contemporary American law.
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO MAKE LAW

Early Approaches
Professor Davis defined legislative facts as follows:
“When an agency [or court] wrestles with a question of law
or policy, it is acting legislatively, [and] the facts which inform
its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts.”7
Legislative facts, in other words, are facts that courts use
when they make law (or “legislate”), rather than simply apply
settled doctrine to resolve a dispute between particular parties
to a case. Whereas the determination of adjudicative facts
affects only the litigants before the court, the determination of
legislative facts influences the content of legal doctrine itself
and, therefore, affects many parties in addition to those who
brought the case. It was Professor Davis’s position that “the
rules of evidence for finding facts which form the basis for creation of law and determination of policy should differ from the
rules for finding facts which concern only the parties to a particular case.”8 In this manner Davis justified the Supreme
Court’s practice in Muller of disregarding the rules of evidence
by accepting “facts” on appeal and in a brief. The rules of evi-

5. Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942) [hereinafter
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence]. Davis’s concepts were
originally advanced in the context of administrative law, but they
were rapidly generalized to other areas of the law.
6. The concept of legislative fact “has been widely accepted in the
federal appellate courts.” Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1357
(11th Cir. 1982). The United States Supreme Court has invoked
the term on numerous occasions, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 169 n. 3 (1986); Concerned Citizens v. Pine Creek
Conservancy Dist., 429 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977);.
7. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 5, at 402.
8. Id. at 364.

dence did not apply to Brandeis’s social science materials: They
were “legislative” facts.
Judicial acceptance of social science research as a form of
legislative fact became commonplace throughout the law after
Brown v. Board of Education.9 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court cited the published research of numerous social
scientists to support its empirical assertion that the segregation
of public schools instills in an African-American child “a sense
of inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn.”10
In the decades since Brown, research has frequently been
invoked by courts to demonstrate the validity of empirical
assumptions made in the process of modifying existing law or
creating new law.11 In Roper v. Simmons,12 for example, the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments permitted the execution of
offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time they committed a capital crime. The Court held that the Constitution
prohibited such executions. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court noted that “as the scientific and sociological studies
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.’”13 Numerous social science studies were brought to bear on this and other conclusions
reached by the Court regarding empirically demonstrated
developmental differences between adolescents and adults.
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not address Davis’s concept of legislative fact. Rather, the Advisory Committee that
wrote the Rules stated that it could construct “no rule”14 to
address how courts should deal with legislative facts. It
appears from the Committee’s commentary to the Rules that
legislative facts can (a) be presented by the parties in briefs on
appeal; (b) be presented by the parties at trial by the testimony
of expert witnesses; (c) be found by the court through sua
sponte library research; or (d) be obtained by an appellate court
remanding a case back to the trial court “for the taking of evidence.”15
Current Approaches
Criticism of the concept of legislative fact has focused on
three topics: How should social science research used to create
or modify law be obtained? Once obtained, how should it be
evaluated? And once evaluated, how should a court’s conclusions about research be established so as to affect subsequent
courts that address the same empirical issue?16
On the first issue, the acknowledgement of the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence that there was “no
rule” that addressed legislative facts has been taken by many to

illustrate the “total failure”17 of the notion of legislative fact to
provide guidance to courts regarding how to obtain social science research for the purpose of creating or modifying law.
After social science research has been obtained by some
unspecified procedure, the court must evaluate it. Social science research varies enormously in quality, and the risk of basing a legal rule on flawed research is significant. Yet neither
Davis nor the Federal Rules that rely on his concept address
this issue at all.
Likewise, if one court draws conclusions from social science
research about an empirical assumption underlying a legal
rule, the concept of legislative fact gives no guidance to the
next judge who confronts the same empirical question. The
options for an appellate court, for example, range from deferring to the trial court’s evaluation of the research under a
“clearly erroneous” standard of review to performing a “de
novo” evaluation of the studies.
It is difficult, therefore, to gainsay the conclusion of a leading text on evidence that “a viable formulation of rules . . . with
regard to legislative facts has not proved feasible.”18
Improvements in the manner that courts use social science
information to create rules of law may be possible only by
abandoning the notion of legislative fact entirely and developing a new concept that fundamentally alters the ways in which
courts view social science materials. Social authority has been
proposed as one alternative to legislative fact as an organizing
principle for courts’ use of social science to create or modify a
rule of law. Under this rubric, courts would treat social science
research relevant to creating or modifying a rule of law as a
source of authority rather than a source of facts. More specifically, courts would treat social science research much as they
treat legal precedent under the common law.
In outline, the argument for this theory is that although
there is a clear conceptual analogy between social science
research and fact (both are “positive” in the sense that they
concern the way the world is, with no necessary implications
for the way the world ought to be), there is an equally clear
conceptual analogy between social science research and law
(both are “general” in that they produce principles applicable
beyond particular instances). It is, therefore, plausible to classify social science research either as fact or as law. The criterion
for classification—whether to give priority to the fact analogy
or to the law analogy—should depend on the quality of the
judicial procedures that flow from it.
A number of coherent procedures for obtaining, evaluating,
and establishing social science research flow from conceiving
of it as social authority rather than as legislative fact. Making
the heuristic presumption that courts should treat social science data the same way they treat legal precedent produces two

9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Id. at 494.
11. See SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 185-382.
12. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
13. Id. at 560 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
14. Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 201(a).
15. Id.
16. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,

Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 477 (1986).
17. STEPHEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 43 (3d ed. 1982).
18. JOHN STRONG, KENNETH BROWN, GEORGE DIX, EDWARD
IMWINKELRIED, D. KAYE, ROBERT MOSTELLER & E. ROBERTS,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 503 (5th ed. 1999). Strong, et al. summarize our approach at 499.
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corollary ideas about how a court should obtain empirical
research: The parties should present empirical research to the
court in written briefs, and judges may find social science
research by searching for it themselves. This is the way that
courts obtain the law. Oral testimony of expert witnesses and
remanding cases to the trial court to obtain evidence would be
disallowed. Likewise, under this view, the way that courts
should evaluate empirical data can be found in the way they
evaluate legal precedent. Courts should evaluate scientific
research studies along four dimensions analogous to those
used to evaluate case precedent:19 Courts should place confidence in social science research to the extent that the research
(a) has survived the critical review of the scientific community,
(b) has used valid research methods, (c) is generalizable to the
legal question at issue, and (d) is supported by a body of other
research. Finally, because legal rules make clear that appellate
courts are not bound by trial courts’ conclusions about law,
appellate courts should also not be bound by trial courts’ conclusions about empirical research: De novo review is the
appropriate standard.20
USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO DETERMINE FACTS

Early Approaches
Professor Davis defined adjudicative facts as follows:
“When an agency [or court] finds facts concerning immediate parties—what the parties did, what the circumstances were,
what the background conditions were—the agency [or court]
is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts.”21
Adjudicative facts, in other words, are facts that apply only
to the particular parties before the court. They are used to
determine (or “adjudicate”) what happened in a specific case,
and not for some larger purpose, such as to argue that the law
should be changed. What Davis called an adjudicative fact has
been referred to by other commentators as a “case fact”22 and
by one court as “a plain, garden-variety fact.”23
One of the most frequent uses of social science research as
adjudicative or case-specific facts involves trademarks. The
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, as amended by the Trademark
Law Revision Act of 1988,24 states that the Patent and
Trademark Office will refuse to register a new trademark if it
so resembles a trademark already registered to another person
“as to be likely . . . to cause confusion.”25 A person who sells a

19. Id. at 498: “At least four indices of precedential persuasiveness can
easily be abstracted from the jurisprudential literature: (1) cases
decided by courts higher in the appellate structure have more
weight than lower court decisions; (2) better reasoned cases have
more weight than poorly reasoned cases; (3) cases involving facts
closely analogous to those in the case at issue have more weight
than cases involving easily distinguished facts; and (4) cases followed by other courts have more weight than isolated cases.”
20. For a discussion of how these dimensions can be made operational by courts, see Social Authority, supra note 16, at 498-508.
What trial or appellate courts should do when confronted with an
empirical question underlying a rule of law for which no research,
or only inadequate research, is available is discussed in John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without
Empirical Answers, 1991 WISCONSIN L. REV. 569.
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product that is likely to cause confusion with an already trademarked product is liable for trademark infringement. Social
science research in the form of surveys of consumers or potential consumers to ascertain the degree of confusion between
products has been admitted in American courts at least since
1940.26 Initially, such evidence was often successfully challenged as contravening the prohibition against hearsay, since
the respondents to the surveys were not present in court to testify. In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports,27 however,
the hearsay objection was definitively laid to rest:
“The weight of case authority, the consensus of legal writers, and reasoned policy considerations all indicate that the
hearsay rule should not bar the admission of properly conducted public surveys.”28
A wide variety of methodologies are now routinely used by
both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark cases to determine
the presence of consumer confusion.29 In Kis v. Foto Fantasy,30
for example, the plaintiff and the defendant both owned photo
booths that were placed inside shopping malls throughout the
United States. Foto Fantasy, the defendant, placed a sketch of
the actor Tom Cruise outside its booths, with a sign reading
“Scan in Your Favorite Celebrities.” Kis, the plaintiff, sued
Foto Fantasy for violating the Lanham Act by creating confusion as to the association of Tom Cruise with defendant’s photo
booths, leading consumers to patronize Foto Fantasy booths
rather than Kis booths. To demonstrate consumer confusion,
Kis introduced as an expert witness a social scientist who conducted an experiment in a shopping mall. In this experiment,
several hundred potential consumers (demographically
matched to the typical consumers of photo booths) were given
pictures of a photo booth. A random half of these potential
consumers were given pictures that included a sketch of Tom
Cruise, and a random half were given pictures of photo booths
without such a sketch. Of the subjects in the former group, 56
percent believed that the actor was associated with Foto
Fantasy booths, a view shared by only 7 percent of the subjects
in the later group. The court denied the defendant’s motion to
exclude the social science expert, and held that any alleged
methodological defects of the experiment went to the weight,
and not to the admissibility, of the evidence. The use of survey
research in consumer-confusion trademark cases like Kis has
become so routine that the failure of a trademark owner to
conduct a survey may now give rise to an adverse inference.31

21. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence, supra note 5, at 402.
22. E.g., THOMAS MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS (1978).
23. Bowling v. Department of Ins., 394 So.2d 165, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
24. The Lanham Act is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. The 1988
amendments are scattered throughout the Act.
25. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).
26. Oneida v. National Silver, 25 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
27. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. Id. at 682.
29. See SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 95-130.
30. 204 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
31. Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Laboratories, 201 F. Supp.2d 335
(D.N.J. 2002).

The party with the burden of proving an adjudicative fact such
as consumer confusion will be severely disadvantaged by a failure to provide the fact-finder with the best possible evidence.
The key to understanding how courts deal with social science research used to determine an adjudicative or case-specific fact is that, unlike legislative facts, adjudicative facts are
susceptible to proof by the usual rules of evidence. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state codes, the admissibility of social science evidence of a case-specific fact turns on
the issue of “relevance.” According to Rule 401:
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”
There are two components to this definition.32 First, to be
relevant, evidence must bear on a fact that is “of consequence.”
This means that even flawlessly executed research is inadmissible if the substantive law governing the case does not put in
issue the fact that the research seeks to demonstrate. Second,
evidence must make that fact “more probable or less probable”
than it would otherwise be. This means that even if social science research directly addresses a fact of central concern to the
substantive law, it will not be admitted unless the research data
provide insight into the likelihood that the fact exists. The first
of these components of relevance is often called materiality and
the second probative value.
Note that under Rule 401 it is not necessary for social science evidence to be determinative of a fact at issue in a case, or
even to make the existence of a fact, such as consumer confusion, “more likely than not,” for the evidence to be admitted.
As long as the research has “any” tendency to be probative of
the existence of material fact, the evidence is relevant and
therefore presumptively admissible (that is, admissible unless
some other rule, such as Rule 403, excluding evidence on the
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, is violated).
Obtaining social science research that bears on an adjudicative fact, therefore, is governed by the normal rules of evidence. Evaluating the research for the purpose of admissibility
is limited to determining whether it is material, whether it has
any probative value, and whether its admission violates any
other evidentiary rule. The ultimate weight to be placed on the
evidence is a matter for the fact-finder. As with any other adjudicative or case-specific fact, the standard of review an appellate court will apply to a trial court’s decisions regarding social
science evidence is “clear error.”

Current Approaches
The law regarding social science research used to determine
adjudicative facts (or what have been called “social facts”33 to
distinguish empirical research from historical case-specific
facts such as who-hit-whom) is much more settled than that
governing research used to determine legislative facts or social
authority. Such evidence is now routinely admitted not only in
trademark cases, but also in obscenity litigation,34 and many
other areas. Recently, social science research has come to play
a decisive role in adjudicating damages in mass-tort cases.35
One view of determining what is precedential about court
decisions on social science evidence used to ascertain adjudicative facts requires that a fundamental distinction be made
between the methodology of the research offered in evidence
and the application of that methodology in a particular case.36
Methodology refers to the broad research design employed to
generate the data and the analytic procedures used to interpret
them. Application refers to the concrete way that a particular
study was carried out. Under this view, precedent attaches only
to the generic methodology of studies—such as the use of a
particular statistical test—in a given area.37

32. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 882-85
(1988) [hereinafter Social Facts].
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); Saliba v. State,
475 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. App. 1985). See generally SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LAW, supra note 1, at 130-57.
35. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 545 (1998); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling
Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329 (1999).
36. Social Facts, supra note 32, at 885-87.
37. The application of a particular methodology in a given case would
be evaluated under the pertinent federal or state rules of evidence.

In federal courts, of course, this would mean an evaluation under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, incorporating Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
38. See generally SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 1, at 383-605.
Other examples discussed there include the battered-woman and
rape-trauma syndromes.
39. 963 S.W.2d 115 (1998). See also John Brigham, Adina
Wasserman, and Christian Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, COURT
REVIEW, Summer 1999, at 12.
40. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
41. Id. at 131.
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USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO PROVIDE CONTEXT

Early Approaches
Most of the judicial uses of social science fall into one of the
two categories originally described by Davis. In recent years,
however, courts have begun to confront uses of social science
research that do not conform to the established classification.
There are increasing indications that a new, third use of social
science in law is emerging. Examples can be found in cases concerning eyewitness identification and sexual victimization.38
In Weatherred v. State,39 the state’s only direct evidence that
the defendant had committed murder was the word of two eyewitnesses. At trial, the expert testimony of a research psychologist was offered by the defendant to counter the testimony of
the eyewitnesses. In a proffer of the evidence, the psychologist
described published studies on factors such as the speed with
which memory decays over time and the relationship between
the confidence of a witness and the accuracy of identification,
both of which were issues in the case. The trial court excluded
the expert. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, stating that the
testimony survived a Daubert40 analysis and that “the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to admit said evidence
before the jury.”41

The defendant in State v. Kinney42 was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault. The trial court had allowed the prosecution to introduce a social scientist as an expert witness to
describe “the behavioral patterns of victims of sexual assault,”
patterns that were also seen in the complainant (e.g., a delay in
reporting the crime). The defense objected to this evidence at
trial and appealed. The Supreme Court of Vermont upheld the
conviction, however, stating that the testimony survived a
Daubert analysis and that “expert evidence of rape trauma syndrome and the associated typical behavior of adult rape victims
is admissible to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence, and
frequently to respond to defense claims that the victim’s behavior after the alleged rape is inconsistent with the claim that the
rape occurred.”43
In neither of these cases was social science research being
used to provide legislative facts. No creation or modification of
a rule of law was sought. Rather, in both cases the parties offering the research accepted the applicable legal rules and sought
to show that the research would help the jury to decide the
specific factual issues being litigated. Yet in neither of these
cases was social science research being used to provide adjudicative facts either. The parties to the cases were not involved
in the research at all: The experts relied on “off-the-rack”
research studies published before the events that gave rise to
the litigation took place.
The way social science was used in Weatherred and Kinney,
however, does reflect the defining characteristics of both legislative fact and adjudicative fact. In each case, the research
used demonstrated the critical component of legislative fact—
generality. Just as the research used in Roper focused on “juveniles’ diminished culpability in general,”44 the research used in
Weatherred focused on factors that “on average” affect eyewitnesses.45 Similarly, the research in Kinney concerned symptoms
that victims of rape “commonly experience.”46 In each case,
the research also possessed the critical component of adjudicative fact—specificity. Just as the research used in Kis spoke
only to whether consumers were confused between two given
products, the studies in Weatherred were used only to challenge the testimony of eyewitnesses to a particular crime, and
the research in Kinney was used only to show that the named
victim was, in fact, sexually assaulted.
The research used in these cases and many like them is thus
neither wholly legislative nor wholly adjudicative fact but has
the essential elements of both of the conventional categories.
Therefore, a third category has been proposed, termed social
framework,47 to denote the use of general conclusions from

social science research to determine factual issues in a specific
case.
Current Approaches
Social science research used as a social framework is becoming common in American courts. It is now often introduced as
if it were simply an adjudicative fact—by expert testimony
before a jury, as it was in Weatherred and Kinney.
Commentators have pointed out that treating social frameworks as adjudicative facts has two significant liabilities.48
First, it is an inefficient use of court time. The same testimony
about the same research studies must be heard in case after
case whenever a framework for a given type of factual determination is sought. Second, introducing frameworks as social
facts is expensive. The pool of expert witnesses is limited to a
small group of basic researchers in each topical area and those
researchers must be transported and paid to repeat their testimony in each new case. Access to expert testimony is therefore
effectively precluded in a large number of cases in which the
introduction of a social framework would seem justified.
An alternative to treating social frameworks as if they were
simple adjudicative facts has been proposed that recognizes the
similarity of social frameworks to both adjudicative fact and
legislative fact as well.49 The proposal is for a two-stage set of
procedures for the judicial management of this use of social
science in court. First, the generality that social frameworks
share with research used as legislative fact or social authority
suggests analogous procedures for obtaining, evaluating, and
establishing social frameworks—obtain the research either in
briefs or through the court’s own investigation, evaluate it as
legal precedent is evaluated, and have one court’s decision on
a social framework affect later courts as one court’s decision on
a matter of law affects later courts. Second, the specificity that
social frameworks share with research used as adjudicative or
social fact suggests similar procedures for communicating the
court’s conclusions to the jury: via instruction.50 The jurors
would then be in a position to apply the general social framework to the specific evidence produced at trial.
In Dukes v. Wal-Mart,51 the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
the certification of the largest employment-discrimination
class in history, with more than 1.5 million women employees
seeking over $1.5 billion in damages. A crucial piece of evidence supporting class certification came from a sociologist
who testified that he performed a “social framework analysis”
to evaluate Wal-Mart “against what social science research
shows to be factors that create and sustain bias”52 and found

42. 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000).
43. Id. at 842.
44. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
45. Weatherred, 963 S.W.2d at 127.
46. Kinney, 762 A.2d at 839.
47. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use
of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 570 (1987).
48. Id. at 583-584.
49. Id. at 587-98. For judicial discussions of this proposal, see State v.
Alger, 764 P.2d 119 (Idaho 1988); Skinner v. State, 33 P.3d 758
(Wyo. 2001); Steve Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach

to Custodial Parent Move-Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L. J. 497, 52432 (1998).
50. On the use of jury instructions to convey empirical information,
see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Cromedy, 727
A.2d 457 (N.J. 1999); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d. 290 (Conn.
2005).
51. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 1178. See Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D. in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, at 5, Dukes v. WalMart Stores, Inc., Case No. C-01-2252 MJJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2003).
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MONAHAN AND WALKER’S GUIDE
FOR USING SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION IN COURT
In outline, our view is that courts should adhere to the
following steps when addressing an empirical question
concerning human behavior:

4. If the empirical issue concerns a factual dispute bearing
only on the parties before the court:
a. Determine the party with the burden of proving the

1. Determine whether the substantive law governing the
case raises an empirical issue to which social science
research may be pertinent.

contested fact.
b. Determine whether the law governing the case makes
empirical research an appropriate form of evidence

2. If so, determine whether the empirical issue bears on an
assumption underlying the choice of a legal rule that has
general applicability, a factual dispute pertaining only to
the parties before the court, or a mixture of the two in
which general empirical information provides a context
for determining a specific fact.
3. If the empirical issue concerns an assumption underlying
the choice of a legal rule of general applicability:
a. Receive social science studies in briefs submitted by
the parties or amici.
b. If the parties or amici do not submit social science
studies, request such studies from the parties or amici,
or obtain them from the court’s own sua sponte investigation of published sources.
c. Evaluate any available research by determining
whether the research has survived the critical review
of the scientific community, has used valid research
methods, is generalizable to the legal issue in question, and is supported by a body of related research.

for meeting this burden.
c. If empirical research does constitute an appropriate
form of evidence, allow the admission of direct and
rebuttal expert testimony subject to the applicable
federal or state rules of evidence.
d. If the party with the burden of proof does not produce
relevant expert testimony, weigh this omission in
determining whether the burden has been met.
5. If the empirical issue concerns the provision of a general
context within which to determine a fact pertaining only
to the parties, then
EITHER:
a. Obtain and evaluate social science research as specified in 3a-3c above.
b. In cases tried before a jury, communicate the conclusions by means of jury instructions.
OR:

d. If no acceptable research is available, candidly state
this conclusion in the opinion. In common-law cases,
rely upon the empirical assumption that appears to
be the most plausible. In reviewing state action, rely
upon the legally appropriate standard of review in
determining where to place responsibility for resolving the empirical issue.
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c. Allow the admission of direct and rebuttal expert testimony subject to the applicable federal or state rules
of evidence.
d. However, do not allow the expert to link general
research findings to a specific party before the court.

the company wanting. As authority for introducing this analysis, the expert—and the Ninth Circuit—relied on the work by
Walker and Monahan, described above, introducing the concept of social framework.53 In a recent article,54 we reviewed
and recast the procedures originally proposed for apprising
juries of general research results to assist in resolving the case
before them.
Experience over the past 20 years has shown that that
courts will typically allow general contextual information from
social science research to be conveyed to the jury by expert
witnesses rather than via instructions, as originally envisioned.
Where this occurs, we believe it essential that courts limit
expert testimony to a description of the findings of relevant
and reliable research and of the methodologies that produced
those findings, and preclude the witness from linking the general research findings to alleged policies and practices of a specific firm. The landmark class action of Dukes v. Wal-Mart
illustrates both the centrality of social framework evidence to
modern employment litigation, as well as the need for courts
to clarify and circumscribe the role of the experts who introduce them.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The exponential growth of social science research dealing
with questions of relevance to the law and the increasing practice of courts in incorporating that research into legal decisions
combine to make the development of a coherent scheme for
the judicial management of social science information a priority for courts and scholars.55 There is longstanding agreement
that one legitimate use of social science is to assist in the creation and modification of legal rules of general applicability.
Legislative fact has been the rubric that has subsumed this use
of research for over 50 years. Given the elasticity and lack of
direction inherent in this concept, it is unlikely to hold sway
much longer. A second accepted use of social science is to provide adjudicative facts for resolving disputes specific to the
parties before a court. The law here is much more settled.
Finally, there is a trend rapidly gaining credibility in American
courts to use social science in a third way, as a social framework providing a general empirical context within which to
determine specific facts at issue in a case. Procedures for the
judicial management of this new use of social science must
blend existing or proposed procedures for the management of
both the law-making and fact-finding uses of research.
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Mental Illness and the Courts:
Some Reflections on Judges as Innovators
John P. Petrila and Allison D. Redlich

I

On January 18, 2006, the Conference of Chief Justices
adopted a resolution endorsing the use of problem-solving
courts to address the impact of mental illness upon the criminal justice system.1 This resolution formally acknowledged the
emergence of therapeutic courts as part of the jurisprudential
mainstream. As important, it highlighted the changing role of
the judiciary in response to the many issues caused by the
prevalence and volume of serious mental illnesses among
defendants in courts across the country.2 In fact, as this article
suggests, state judges have been responsible for some of the
most innovative solutions to these issues, a trend likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Some judges have embraced
this new role, others have not, but—regardless of perspective—it is difficult for any criminal judge today to simply
ignore the issue of mental illness.

There were approximately 14 million arrests in the United
States in 2005.3 The most conservative estimate is that approximately 900,000 of these arrestees were acutely mentally ill at
the time of the arrest.4 When substance abuse and other mental illness diagnoses are considered, the prevalence of mental
disorder among arrestees is over 70%.5 In addition, it is estimated that between 16% and 24% of people who are in jails
and prisons have a major diagnosable mental illness such as
depression, schizophrenia, or other psychotic or bipolar disorders.6 Again, if all mental disorders—including substanceabuse disorders—are included, the prevalence of mental disorder in incarcerated populations is over 70%.
Until three decades ago, the majority of people with severe
mental illnesses were confined for at least part of the time in
state psychiatric hospitals. However, since then there has been
a major diminution of the role of state hospitals, while the
number of people with mental illnesses in jails and prisons has
increased significantly. For example, in 2000, people with
severe mental illnesses were more than five times likely to be
confined to a jail than to a state psychiatric hospital (the rate
of hospitalization in state psychiatric hospitals was 22 people
per 100,000, but the rate of confinement in jail was 113 people with severe mental illnesses per 100,000.7) This is not to
suggest that the answer to the problem of mental disorder in
the criminal justice system is to recreate the state psychiatric
hospital system. Rather, as we suggest below, the lack of effective community treatment in many jurisdictions is a more
pressing issue than the absence of state hospital beds. In addition, changes in sentencing policy, particularly regarding substance-abuse offenses, has contributed to the influx of people
with mental disorders. However, regardless of why it has hap-

Footnotes
1. Conference of Chief Justices, Policy Statements and Resolutions,
Resolution 11, In Support of the Judicial Criminal Justice/Mental
Health Leadership Initiative, January 18, 2006, available at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/CriminalAdultResolutions/resol11Judicial
CriminalJusticeMentalHealthInitiative.html.
2. Therapeutic courts are a comparatively recent development; the
first drug court emerged in 1989 in Dade County, Florida, and the
first mental-health courts of this era began in 1997 in Broward
County, Florida and Marion County, Indiana. Today there are
more than 1,000 such courts in the United States and their “fit”
within the traditional justice system has been the subject of frequent discussion, including in this journal. For an example, see
Daniel J. Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving
Courts Into the Mainstream: A Report Card from the CCJ-COSCA
Problem-Solving Courts Committee, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at
1. See also Aubrey Fox and Greg Berman, Going to Scale: A
Conversation About the Future of Drug Courts, COURT REVIEW, Fall
2002, at 4. Therapeutic courts have been developed in a number

of other countries as well. John Petrila, An Introduction to Special
Jurisdiction Courts. 26 INT’L J. LAW AND PSYCH. 3 (2003).
Table 29, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States (2005), available at http://www.fbi.
gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html.
NAT’L GAINS CTR., THE PREVALENCE OF CO-OCCURRING MENTAL
ILLNESS AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS IN JAILS (rev. ed. 2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/disorders/gainsjailprev.pdf.
Id.
RICHARD LAMB AND LINDA E. WEINBERGER, THE SHIFT OF PSYCHIATRIC
INPATIENT CARE FROM HOSPITALS TO JAILS AND PRISONS, 33 J. AMER.
ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW 529 (2005). For the underlying data behind
Lamb and Weinberger’s estimates, see NAT’L COMM’N ON
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, 2 THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BERELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ix-x, 57-80 (2002),
available at http://www.ncchc.org/pubs/pubs_stbr.html.
Id.

ssues raised by the influx of defendants with serious mental
illnesses are some of the most important that criminal
judges confront. Because of the volume of defendants with
mental illnesses, the impact goes beyond that of the individual
case and extends to jails, police and sheriff departments, the
treatment system, and ultimately to the role of the judge. This
article suggests some of the ways in which communities have
attempted to respond to these issues, and highlights the fact
that judges have become significant leaders as well as innovators in such efforts. Not every judge will decide to adopt one
or more of these roles, but regardless, it is likely that the issues
that mental illness creates for the criminal justice system will
exist far into the future.
PART 1. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
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4.
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6.

7.

pened, it is clear that there are many more individuals with
major mental illnesses in the criminal justice system today
than was the case 20 or 30 years ago.
The increase poses serious problems for the individual and
for the justice system. People with mental illnesses are jailed
on average two to three times longer than individuals without
a mental illness arrested for a similar crime. A stay in jail may
exacerbate the person’s illness, and an arrest record may further complicate the person’s efforts to live successfully in the
community. In addition, jails incur significant costs associated
with the oversight of individuals with mental illnesses (particularly regarding the threat of suicide) and for medication and
other health-care services.
Mental-illness issues also present complications for a judge.
Many criminal courts have overburdened dockets, which allow
little time for an individual case. Yet dispositional questions
involving a defendant with an acute mental illness are often
not readily resolved. Ordering a competency examination may
be easy; deciding whether and how to gain access to treatment
that the individual needs may be considerably more difficult.8
In addition, judges often encounter the same defendant with
mental illness repeatedly; the individual is arrested usually for
a comparatively minor offense, is released often for time served
but with no access to treatment, and is then rearrested for the
same type of offense. This cycle with “repeat defendants” creates frustration for judges unable to gain access to treatment
that might have some impact on the defendant’s behavior.
As the impact of mental illness on the criminal justice system has grown, judges increasingly have become leaders in
seeking innovative solutions. This has often been by default;
few judges take the bench with a primary goal of designing
solutions to systemic issues that often appear to flow from failures in the mental-health and human-services systems. Yet in
many communities, judges may be the only officials with the
necessary formal and symbolic authority to create change.
This article describes a number of innovations that have
been developed by individual judges and others within the
criminal justice system in response to mental-illness issues. We
first briefly describe the realities of today’s mental-health system, which provides the context in which many criminal
courts now sit. We then briefly discuss a number of discrete
initiatives (pre-arrest diversion programs; post-arrest diversion
programs, including therapeutic courts; post-disposition oversight, including specialty probation for defendants with mental illness) that various communities have tried. We conclude
with some comments on the role of the judge in identifying
and resolving these issues. We do not suggest that these initiatives are a good fit for every community. In fact, it is quite clear
that local circumstances are the first thing that must be considered in determining which solutions to attempt. Nor will

8. It may be difficult even to gain access to treatment services for
competency restoration. In Florida, judges held the Secretary of
the state agency responsible for providing such services in contempt because of long waiting lists for beds in the hospitals
charged with providing competency restoration. Abby
Goodnough, Officials Clash Over Mentally Ill in Florida Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006.

every judge wish to adopt a
proactive role in seeking
solutions. But addressing
the needs of defendants
with serious mental illnesses will be a problem
that confronts virtually
every criminal court judge,
and so it may be useful,
particularly for judges new
to these issues, to have
information regarding the
strategies
communities
have used in response.

[M]any defendants
with serious mental
illness are arrested
on relatively minor
charges, and
therefore formal
competency
adjudications . . .
may have little
appeal . . . .

Contextual issues. Mental illness has always been an issue
in the criminal justice system, primarily because of its potential impact on mental state. Competency to stand trial assessments were (and continue to be) a staple of criminal proceedings, and the insanity defense and related pleas—such as
guilty but mentally ill—have continuing relevance in a modest number of cases. In addition, courts have long made mental-health treatment a condition of disposition in resolving
some criminal cases.
However, these traditional tools have little relevance to the
vast majority of the people arrested each year who are acutely
ill at the time of arrest. This is for at least two reasons. First,
many defendants with serious mental illness are arrested on
relatively minor charges, and therefore formal competency
adjudications and pleas of insanity may have little appeal as a
practical matter, though legally they might be preferred.
Second, even if these mechanisms were employed in every one
of the 900,000 cases in which the defendant is acutely ill at the
time of arrest, it would only further exacerbate the problem of
overburdened court dockets, because these issues do not lend
themselves to quick disposition. As a result, many of the innovations discussed below are designed either to reduce the number of acutely ill defendants who enter the criminal justice system or to shorten the time spent there.
There have also been major changes in the last few decades
in the treatment of people with serious mental illnesses.9
Three are relevant here. First, the location and duration of
much treatment has changed. State psychiatric hospitals used
to provide most long-term care for serious mental illnesses.
Most psychiatric hospital care today is provided in community
outpatient settings because of a number of factors, including
horrific conditions that developed in many state hospitals, as
well as changing philosophies of—and advancements in—
treatment. Community outpatient care is designed largely to
control and reduce symptoms. Inpatient care is generally

9. It should be noted that the influx of people with drug-abuse disorders that eventually resulted in the development of drug courts
was caused in large part by changes in criminal laws, which
brought more defendants into the criminal justice system for
offenses related to substance abuse and resulted in lengthier sentences as well. See Petrila, supra note 2.
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short-term, and occurs most
often in psychiatric units of
community hospitals. There
is little long-term, inpatient
care for psychiatric illnesses
available in the United States
today.
Second, and relatedly, most
people with serious mental illnesses spend the vast majority
of their time in the community. At this juncture, it is beyond dispute that most people with
serious mental illnesses can be treated successfully in the community and live productive lives, even if they suffer relapses
during treatment.10 However, the network of treatment services, social supports, and housing necessary to provide such
treatment is rarely available in sufficient supply and in many
communities is woefully lacking. As a result, many people with
serious mental illnesses receive little or inadequate treatment.
As a result, the symptoms of serious mental illness may be exacerbated. Mental illness does not necessarily lead to arrest, but
conduct that may lead to arrest, such as loitering, public urination, or petty theft, may become more likely in the absence of
treatment and social stability for at least some individuals with
serious mental illnesses.
Third, the primary locus of responsibility for dealing with
these failed treatment systems has shifted in many places from
state government to local communities. The federal government funds many mental-health services through the Medicare
and Medicaid programs but plays virtually no role in designing
treatment systems. State governments traditionally assumed a
leadership role for designing mental health services through
the state mental health agency. However, many states have
reduced funding for mental-health as a percentage of human
services funding, and the authority of many state mentalhealth commissioners has been reduced as states grapple with
rising costs in their Medicaid programs.
While there may not be a direct correlation between these
changes and the impact of mental illnesses on local courts,
they are contextual factors that have shifted the venue for
innovative responses to local communities. Over time, a number of strategies have emerged in various communities that

As indicated above, the volume of persons with mental illness coming into contact with the justice system is so immense
that the majority of communities have developed their own
informal and formal strategies to combat associated issues. We
focus here on formalized strategies that occur at different
points along the criminal justice continuum, including 1) prearrest diversion programs; 2) post-arrest diversion programs,
including mental-health courts; and 3) specialty probation.
Below we provide brief descriptions and operational definitions of these three subtypes. For more detailed information,
we refer interested readers to the National GAINS Center and
its Technical Assistance and Policy Analysis Center for Jail
Diversion11 and the Council of State Governments’ Criminal
Justice Mental Health website.12 These on-line resources offer
many free publications, including guides on how to implement
different diversion programs as well as an overview of the mental health service system for criminal justice professionals.13
Formal diversion programs for persons with mental illness
are growing in popularity and number. While it is accurate to
state that these diversion programs have resulted from local
initiatives, the federal government also has demonstrated support. Specifically, the President’s New Freedom Commission on
Mental Health14 recommended “widely adopting adult criminal justice and juvenile justice diversion….strategies to avoid
the unnecessary criminalization and extended incarceration of
non-violent adult and juvenile offenders with mental illness.”
Further, over the past five years, federal government agencies,
such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Administration, have contributed
millions of dollars in grant funds toward the creation of local
diversion programs.15
Pre-arrest diversion. As the name implies, pre-arrest—or
pre-booking—diversion programs focus on diverting persons
to treatment as an alternative to arrest. Such programs depend
on law enforcement given that police and sheriff’s deputies
make the vast majority of decisions whether or not to arrest an
individual engaged in criminal behavior. It is becoming
increasingly popular because this type of diversion when suc-

10. Relapse is common for the most serious mental illnesses, for
example, schizophrenia. As one group of commentators recently
noted, “the course of early-phase schizophrenia is characterized
by initial improvement in symptoms followed by repeated relapse
and a low rate of sustained recovery.” However, the same authors
note that early intervention with effective medications can result
in good control of symptoms and that even those who may not
respond to treatment of an initial episode of treatment may attain
recovery over time, given adequate treatment. Delbert G.
Robinson et al., Pharmacological Treatments for First-Episode
Schizophrenia, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 705 (2005). Not all mental
illnesses are as devastating as schizophrenia, but because they
often manifest themselves episodically, it is difficult to assume
that an individual with a serious mental illness will necessarily be
wholly compliant with court orders, particularly in the absence of
adequate treatment and supervision.

11. See http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/html/default.asp.
12. See http://www.consensusproject.org/.
13. JACKIE MASSARO, OVERVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS (2005), available at http://
209.132.230.103/pdfs/jail_diversion/MassaroII.pdf.
14. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING
THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HELATH CARE IN AMERICA 4344 (2003) (hereinafter ACHIEVING THE PROMISE], available at http://
www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/toc.html.
15. See, e.g., America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3711, 3796ii-3796ii-7, 3793, Pub. L. 106-515 (2000). It
is also worth noting that these grants have often been comparatively small, and while they have been important in seeding local
projects, the funds allocated by the federal government for diversion are rarely adequate to enable the programs to sustain themselves.
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appear to hold some promise. We discuss the most common
strategies below.
PART 2. STRATEGIES

cessful can have an impact on
court dockets and the use of
jail beds.
There are three basic types
of
pre-arrest
diversion:
1) police-based specialized
police response, 2) policebased specialized mentalhealth response, and 3) mental-health-based specialized
mental-health response.16 In
the first model, police officers are specially trained in crisis
intervention and act as liaisons to the mental-health system. In
the second model, mental-health professionals collaborate
with police to provide on-site or telephone consultation on
responding to individual cases. In the third model, which is the
most common, mental-health professionals provide on-site
help to the police in situations involving persons with mental
illness.17
One of the most successful and most duplicated models for
pre-arrest diversion is the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
model, originally developed in Memphis, Tennessee. Today,
many major and smaller U.S. cities have adopted CIT programs
of their own. The CIT program in Memphis has been described
in the following manner: A cadre of selected patrol officers (10
to 20 percent of those assigned to patrol) receive extra training
(40 hours initially) and then serve as generalists/specialists;
they perform the full range of regular patrol duties, but respond
immediately (from anywhere in the city) whenever crisis situations occur involving people with mental illness. In those situations, these officers assume on-scene command as soon as they
arrive. They are trained to handle the crisis situations as well as
to facilitate the delivery of treatment and other services. In particular, they become knowledgeable about voluntary and involuntary commitment, plus they become well known to professionals in the mental-health community, facilitating the delivery of treatment and other services to the people in crisis.18
Three core factors have been identified as essential to the
success of a pre-arrest diversion program. The first is training.
The Memphis CIT model prides itself on its 40-hour (plus)
intensive training for officers selected for the program. The cur-

riculum includes information on mental illness, crisis skills,
and a heavy concentration on interactive activities, such as role
play. Refresher trainings are utilized as well. The second core
element is the creation of partnerships between community
mental-health providers and law-enforcement officials. Prearrest diversion programs require that police have access to
treatment services reliably, predictably, and at all hours. If an
officer finds it more difficult to gain access to assessment and
treatment than to arrest the individual, diversion programs will
founder. Therefore, in developing this option, communities
often use a single point of entry to services, assure that no one
referred for services will be refused at least an assessment, and
provide streamlined intakes for police officers.19 The third core
element is re-conceptualizing the traditional police-officer role
for the specialized-diversion officers. That is, under the CIT
model, officers volunteer or are specially selected rather than
randomly assigned, and the agency promotes collegiality and a
sense of shared responsibility among the officers. It is also
important that relevant statutes and policies encourage and
support rather than create impediments to diversion. For example, crisis facilities must be enabled legally to accept and detain
persons who may or may not have criminal charges pending.
Early research suggests that pre-arrest diversion programs
can be successful in creating access to treatment without creating additional community risk. For example, in comparison
to persons not diverted, persons diverted were more likely to
be in counseling and to be taking prescribed medications. Rearrest rates were not higher than those for non-diverted populations, despite the fact that individuals diverted before arrest
were typically in the community for longer periods of time
(and therefore potentially at risk for behavior leading to
another arrest) than non-diverted individuals.20 Currently, a
major evaluation is underway of 32 pre and post-booking
diversion programs, which may provide more definitive
answers to whether pre-diversion programs are successful, for
whom, and why.
Post-arrest diversion. After a person is arrested, formal
diversion can occur at any point during the criminal process.
We first discuss post-arrest, or post-booking diversion programs generally, and address mental-health courts (MHCs)
separately.

16. For discussions of the various methods for organizing pre-arrest
diversion, see Martha Williams-Dean et al., Emerging Partnerships
between Mental Health and Law Enforcement, 50 PSYCH. SERVICES 99
(1999); Henry Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major
Models of Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 PSYCH.
SERVICES 645 (2000).
17. MELISSA REULAND, A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING POLICE-BASED
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2004),
available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/
PERF.pdf.
18. This description is taken from an article at the website of the
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing: Gary Cordner, People with
Mental Illness 4 (2006), available at http://popcenter.org/
problems/mental_illness. The article provides a good description
not only of the CIT model but also of a number of other
approaches adopted by police departments across the United
States in addressing issues involving people with mental illnesses.

The growing popularity of CIT as a strategy is reflected in attendance at the 2nd National CIT Conference held in fall 2006 in
Orlando. It was attended by more than 800 individuals from 40
states, Canada, and Australia. Many of the attendees were police
officers, and there were a number of judges in attendance and presenting as well.
19. Henry Steadman et al., A Specialized Crisis Response as a Core
Element of Police-Based Diversion Programs, 52 PSYCH. SERVICES 219
(2001).
20. See Michelle Naples & Henry Steadman, Can Persons with CoOccurring Disorders and Violent Charges Be Successfully Diverted?,
2 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 137 (2003); THE NATIONAL
GAINS CTR. FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHAT CAN WE SAY ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PERSONS WITH CO-OCCURRING
DISABILITIES? (2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/
pdfs/jail_diversion/WhatCanWeSay.pdf.
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Post-booking diversion. Post-booking diversion programs,
like pre-arrest diversion programs, seek to engage eligible persons in community treatment with the hope that treatment will
reduce the risk of behavior leading to future arrests. An obvious difference between the two approaches is that pre-arrest
diversion attempts to keep the person from entering the criminal justice system at all, while post-arrest programs are not
used until the person has already been arrested.
Post-booking diversion programs may seek to divert the
individual to treatment at any point during the criminal
process, and therefore, depending on the program, referrals
may come from a variety of parties to the criminal justice system, including jail officials, law enforcement, magistrates,
judges, and attorneys. One commentator suggests that there
are two particularly important points at which defendants may
be diverted post-arrest. The first is at the person’s first court
appearance, which in many jurisdictions will occur within a
day or two after arrest. At this point, an arraigning judge might
order the person released to community treatment as an alternative to continuing custody. A second point at which diversion might occur is when the prosecutor decides whether to
proceed with charges. If the prosecutor is aware that the person has been accepted into a diversion program, he or she may
be more willing to hold charges in abeyance pending successful completion of the program. Six critical elements of these
diversion strategies have been identified: 1) involvement of all
key parties (e.g., judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, mental-health providers, etc.), 2) strong judicial leadership, 3)
quick access to services to assess the defendant’s mental health,
4) availability of mental-health-treatment resources, 5) assistance to the defendant in complying with imposed treatment
conditions, and 6) patience among professionals from differing
and sometimes conflicting systems. Of importance, both
options—pretrial release and deferred prosecution—can occur
in a matter of days after arrest.21
Post-diversion arrest also can take place much later. For
example, a person may come before another judge who suspects the person may have a mental illness and be eligible for
diversion. Similarly, a person’s attorney, after some interaction,
may conclude that the best option for his or her client is the
diversion program. Diversion may even occur after sentencing,
such that the sentence of jail or prison time is put on hold
pending successful completion of treatment. Each of these
options is available even if there is no formal effort at diversion; however, many communities have begun to attempt to
formalize the processes by which defendants may be diverted

into treatment as the crimNew York City’s
inal process proceeds.
A successful example of Nathaniel Project . . .
a post-booking diversion
began in 2000 and
program attempting to
appears to be very
address the needs of indieffective in gaining
viduals charged with
felonies is New York City’s
access to treatment
Nathaniel Project. The
while reducing
Nathaniel
Project
is
re-arrest . . . .
“exclusively for people
with psychiatric disabilities who have been indicted on a felony offense and are facing
a lengthy sentence in New York State prison…. the program
will consider any defendant regardless of offense, including
violent offenses.”22 The Nathaniel Project began in 2000 and
appears to be very effective in gaining access to treatment
while reducing re-arrest: new arrests among their clients have
dramatically decreased, 100% of their clients are engaged in
treatment, and after one year, 79% had permanent housing.
While many communities will choose not to focus diversion
efforts on those charged with felonies, the Nathaniel Project
provides evidence that diversion to treatment in lieu of incarceration can be effective in some circumstances even for a difficult population of offenders with mental illness.
Mental-health courts. Mental-health courts are one of the
fastest growing vehicles for addressing the needs of mentally ill
defendants. The first two mental-health courts appeared in
1997 in Marion County, Indiana and Broward County, Florida.
However, today, there are estimated to be more than 150 U.S.
mental-health courts with the number continuing to grow
rapidly. A survey completed in January 2005 determined that
MHCs were in operation in 34 states with many of the states
operating multiple MHCs in different counties and jurisdictions.23 Like other diversion programs, these therapeutic
courts attempt to provide defendants with access to treatment
and oversight with the goal of reducing the likelihood of future
cycling through the criminal justice system.
Although MHCs vary in their procedures, operations, and
eligibility requirements, there are several defining characteristics. First, MHCs are criminal courts, usually with one judge
carrying a dedicated docket.24 Second, MHCs typically have
mental-health and criminal justice eligibility criteria in that
they will only allow in persons with certain diagnoses and/or
certain criminal charges. Earlier, or first-generation, mentalhealth courts usually limited their docket to misdemeanants,

21. For a general discussion of this type of diversion, see JOHN CLARK,
NON-SPECIALTY FIRST APPEARANCE COURT MODELS FOR DIVERTING
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: ALTERNATIVES TO MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS (2004), available at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/
jail_diversion/pre_trial_nocover.pdf.
22. For a description of the Nathaniel Project, see THE NATIONAL
GAINS CTR. FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, THE NATHANIEL PROJECT: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
INCARCERATION PROGRAM FOR PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
WHO HAVE COMMITTED FELONY OFFENSES (rev. ed. 2005), available
at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/nathaniel_
project.pdf.

23. Allison D. Redlich et al., Patterns of Pracice in Mental Health
Courts: A National Survey, 30 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 347
(2006).
24. It is worth noting that most mental-health courts have been created from existing resources; few jurisdictions have obtained
additional judicial or attorney resources for these courts. In addition, caseloads in most jurisdictions are comparatively small (a
mental-health court with a docket of more than 100 cases would
be a relatively large mental-health court), and so the judge who
presides over the court typically does so in addition to his or her
usual responsibilities.
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but a number of more recent courts use a mixed (misdemeanor-felony) caseload or only felony cases.25 Third, MHCs
not only require the defendant to receive treatment but also
arrange for supervision and oversight of treatment compliance.
Oversight takes several forms; for example, the judge will hold
periodic status hearings on most cases, and ongoing supervision is provided by the probation officers, case managers,
and/or MHC personnel. Fourth, the courts use a mix of incentives and sanctions in an effort to gain compliance. Incentives
might include praise in the courtroom from the judge or gift
cards marking progress with treatment, while punishment can
range from reprimands from the judge to incarceration. Fifth,
the courts generally adopt the philosophy of “therapeutic
jurisprudence,” which is an approach to law that places the
therapeutic or non-therapeutic impact of legal rules and
processes at the core of judging and practice.26 Finally, participation in all mental-health courts is voluntary, and it is generally estimated that approximately 5% of defendants offered
participation in a mental-health court decline.27
While MHCs continue to proliferate, they are not without
controversy. Some of the controversies concern the use of jail
as a sanction, whether the courts are truly voluntary, and
whether MHCs are appropriate venues for persons charged
with low-level crimes. Another issue is whether or not the
courts “work.” That is, do mental-health courts cause people
to engage in treatment and ultimately reduce or eliminate
future criminal justice involvement? Preliminary research suggests that the courts can be effective, especially when demographic, criminal, and diagnostic factors are considered, but
the studies done to date have been of single courts, and so it is
difficult to generalize from their findings.28
To encourage standardization of MHC operations and
requirements, the Council of State Governments (CSG) has
proposed 10 “essential elements” of mental-health-court design
and implementation.29 Although we list them here, readers are
referred to the original document for more specific information
on each element. The elements that must be tended to in the
CSG’s judgment are 1) Planning and Administration,
2) Identification of the Target Population, 3) Timely Participant

Identification and Linkage to
[T]he Council of
Services, 4) Terms of Participation, 5) Informed Choice, State Governments
has proposed
6) Treatment Supports and
Services, 7) Confidentiality,
10 “essential
8) Identi-fication of the
elements” of
Mental Health Court Team,
mental health court
9) Monitoring Adherence to
design and
Court Requirements, and
implementation.
10) Sustainability. In addition, CSG has identified five
MHCs as “learning sites.” The learning sites have been designated to provide support, including observation opportunities,
to other courts looking to set up or expand upon an existing
mental health court.” The five courts were chosen primarily
because of their fidelity to the Essential Elements. Judges and
others who are considering establishing a MHC in their community might first obtain the Essential Elements of a Mental
Health Court guide, and perhaps contact one or more of the
MHCs identified as learning sites.30
Specialty probation. A more recent development for
addressing the needs of defendants with mental illness is specialty probation. Because probationers with mental-health
issues often have distinct issues that might affect their ability
to comply with the usual conditions of probation, they may
require more intensive supervision. While specialty probation
is not a diversion program, a growing emphasis on it as a tool
makes it worth mentioning here.
As discussed by Skeem, Emke-Francis, and Eno Louden,31
specialty probation differs from traditional probation in several
ways. In comparison to traditional probation officers, specialty
probation officers 1) have exclusive caseloads of persons with
mental illness, 2) have reduced caseloads (e.g., 30 open cases),
and 3) receive mental-health training. Additionally, specialty
probation officers tend to forge close working relationships
with other professionals in the community relevant to the probationers’ well-being. For example, specialty probation officers
report having close relationships with treatment providers and

25. Allison Redlich et al., The Second Generation of Mental Health
Courts, 11 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & LAW 527 (2005).
26. David Wexler and Bruce Winick, two law professors, are primarily responsible for the emergence of “therapeutic jurisprudence”
as an approach to law. They have written extensively regarding the
topic, as well as the manner in which therapeutic jurisprudence
might be applied to various legal issues. One of their books is
devoted specifically to therapeutic jurisprudence and the role of a
judge. BRUCE WINICK & DAVID WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003).
27. Allison Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?
Comprehension in Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y &
LAW 605 (2005).
28. For results from two single court studies, see Annette Christy et
al., Evaluating the Efficiency and Community Safety Goals of the
Broward County Mental Health Court, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 227
(2005); Merith Cosden, Jeffrey Ellens, Jeffrey Schnell & Yasmeen

Yamini-Diouf, Efficacy of a Mental Health Treatment Court with
Assertive Community Treatment, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 199 (2005),
available at http://czresearch.com/dropbox/Cosden_BehavSci
Law_2005v23p199.pdf.
29. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS JUSTICE CENTER, IMPROVING
RESPONSES TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES: THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF A MENTAL HEALTH COURT (2008), available at
http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/essential.elements.pdf.
30. Id. Additional resources may be viewed at http://consensuspro
ject.org. The five learning sites are the Akron (Ohio) Municipal
Mental Health Court, the Bonneville (Idaho) County Mental
Health Court, the Bronx (New York) County Mental Health
Court, the Dougherty (Georgia) Superior Court, and the Washoe
County (New York) Mental Health Court. See http://consensus
project.org/mhcp/.
31. Jennifer Skeem et al., Probation, Mental Health, and Mandated
Treatment, 33 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 158 (2006).

Court Review - Volume 43 171

case managers. Finally, specialty officers report utilizing problem-solving strategies as their first strategy to
deal with probationers’ noncompliance (e.g., generating
alternative strategies, and
modifying treatment plans
jointly with the probationer)
rather than initially seeking
punishment for violation of
probation
conditions.
Currently, a comprehensive
research study is underway
comparing outcomes (e.g., re-arrests, treatment utilization) of
probationers under traditional and specialty models.

All judges with a criminal docket must address issues created by the presence of growing numbers of defendants with
serious mental illnesses. However, individual judges will have
different views about the appropriateness of assuming an
active role in addressing these issues.
A recent article in this journal by Roger Hanson asserted,
“…there are few judges who would claim that judging today is
just like it was 30 years ago, or like they think it was 30 years
ago.”32 Hanson observed that the emergence of problem-solving courts and problem-solving judges was having a significant
impact on the discussion regarding judicial role. He characterized the discussion in the following manner:
“Frequently the discussion is framed in terms of whether
the judiciary should be expected to behave in one of two polaropposite ways. Should they be primarily almost aloof finders of
fact, impartial and nearly devoid of intimate contact with and

knowledge of litigants and their circumstances? Or should
they be one of many possible partners to a diagnostic, therapeutically oriented response process to ameliorate underlying
and messy problems of litigants?”33
Therefore, the manner in which a particular judge defines
his or her role is a threshold question that will significantly
influence whether the judge then plays the additional roles
described briefly below. It should be noted that there is considerable evidence that many judges are interested in assuming
a more active role in assuring access to community services for
defendants with mental illnesses or substance-abuse problems
and for those who have been victims of domestic violence.34
The judge as community convener and leader. Problemsolving or therapeutic courts by definition create a different
relationship between the court and the surrounding community. Community treatment providers may lack experience in
dealing with the needs of individuals who come into treatment
through the criminal justice system, may be reluctant to assume
responsibility for such clients because of liability concerns, and
may be wary of working too closely with the criminal courts.35
In addition, the lack of adequate housing is a systemic issue
that affects the ability of nearly all people with serious mental
illnesses to live successfully in the community and will become
an issue for judges who seek to achieve successful treatment
outcomes for defendants, particularly in therapeutic courts.36
For these reasons and for the reasons noted in Part 1 of this
article, a judge who wishes to play an active role in addressing
mental-illness issues may find that leadership is not forthcoming from the treatment community. As a result, a judge may find
that assuming a leadership role is critical in bringing together
community stakeholders. There has been considerable commentary in the last decade regarding why and how courts might
reach out to communities, so the topic is not new.37 The need
for such a leadership role also is assumed as a sine qua non for

32. Roger Hanson, The Changing Role of a Judge and Its Implications,
COURT REVIEW, Winter 2002, at 10.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Aubrey Fox, And the Survey Says . . . : State Court Judges
and Problem-Solving Courts, in CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, A
PROBLEM-SOLVING REVOLUTION, MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN IN STATE
COURTS (2004); Fox’s chapter is available at http://www.courtinFox
novation.org/_uploads/documents/andthesurveysays.pdf.
reports the majority of judges responding to a survey of approximately 500 judges believed that the courts should be active in
attempting to create access to services; he also reported widespread interest in problem-solving courts among the respondents.
In a number of judicial systems, creating access to treatment for
some types of defendants has become an article of faith; for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has asserted
“Court involvement creates a crisis in a person’s life, and courts
are uniquely situated to take advantage of the crisis by directing
the person toward treatment. A timely response to the individual’s
crisis is most likely to lead to success in treatment.” Supreme
Judicial Court Standards on Substance Abuse, Standard 5,
Commentary. This and the other standards set by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court can be found at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/substancev.html
35. DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING

DOOR: A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS (2001), available
at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/rethink
ingtherevolvingdoor.pdf.
36. Finding housing for people with mental illnesses is a long-standing problem in part because of stigma associated with mental illness and in part for economic reasons. In the last two decades,
there has been significant experimentation with different models
of housing, particularly regarding the linkage between housing
and treatment. See, e.g., Sam Tsemberis, Ph.D. & Ronda F.
Eisenberg, M.A., Pathways to Housing: Supported Housing for
Street-Dwelling Homeless Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities,
51 PSYCH. SERVICES 487 (2000); Pamela Clark Robbins et al., The
Use of Housing as Leverage to Increase Adherence to Psychiatric
Treatment in the Community, 33 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HELATH &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES RES. 226 (2006).
37. For example, David Rottman et al. have suggested that six benefits accrue from judicial outreach to communities: 1) an opportunity to influence public opinion and increase accessibility and
fairness, 2) the opportunity to permit judges to respond to public
criticism thereby strengthening judicial independence, 3) the
opportunity to create better case dispositions, 4) the opportunity
to create new programs required by defendants and victims in
court proceedings, 5) an opportunity to strengthen communities
by combining the force of judicial sanctions with the power of
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judges overseeing therapeutic
courts.38 However, a judge
may wish to convene community leaders before a therapeutic court or other specific initiatives are developed. A
judge may be the one community official with sufficient
prestige and authority to create a venue for discussion
that other community leaders
feel obligated to attend.
Indeed, the Conference of
Chief Justices, in the resolution noted at the beginning of
this article, stated, “while
leadership can come from different facets of the criminal justice
and mental health systems, judges are particularly well positioned to lead reform efforts because of their unique ability to
convene stakeholders.”39
In considering strategies for addressing mental-illness
issues, a judge might consider convening a number of parties,
including the state’s attorney, the public defender, the major
local treatment providers, the local hospital that operates the
major emergency services (since many people with mental illnesses may be hospitalized in the emergency room during an
acute phase of illness), the sheriff and other local law-enforcement representatives, and social-welfare administrators. Each
of these parties (and this list may not be exhaustive) will have

some responsibility for—and feel the impact of—the issues
associated with serious mental illness. Each will be necessary
to creating any solutions to these issues.
If such a meeting occurs, little can be done in a single session. In most communities, these are parties that are typically
not used to working together, and the building of enough trust
to have non-defensive conversations occur ordinarily takes
time. But over time, at least three things may happen. First,
some measure of trust will develop. Second, once it does, problem identification may occur at both the individual-case level
and at a systemic level. In many communities, a number of
individuals will be known to all parts of the system; discussion
of those individuals may assist in identifying gaps in services
at a more general level.40 Finally, such meetings, over time, will
enable community leaders to discuss a variety of strategies,
rather than a single strategy. Not every strategy fits every community, and efforts by one part of the criminal justice or treatment systems to impose a solution on all parts of those systems
may have little chance of success. However, a group of community leaders that has developed trust may have the opportunity to sift through a variety of strategies, considering them
against the backdrop of the group’s collective knowledge of
local resources, capacities, and political realities.41
The judge as program designer. Few communities have
adequate treatment capacity for individuals with mental illnesses, and judges may conclude that treatment services for
defendants in the criminal justice system are particularly lacking. This may be true, especially for the very high percentage
of defendants with co-occurring mental illness and substance-

community networks to create better access to treatment and
other resources, and 6) an opportunity to better accommodate
concerns regarding diversity. David B. Rottman, Pamela Casey &
Hillery Efkeman, Court and Community Collaboration: Ends and
Means (1998), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/endsmeans.htm. For another of many examples, the work of the California Court and Community
Collaboration Project provides a number of documents on community collaboration largely initiated by the courts. See
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/community/
38. In other countries where therapeutic courts have been created, the
judge as community leader is also considered essential. For example, a commentary reporting on such courts in Australia, Canada,
and the United States observed “Judges in community courts are
expected to have a high profile in the local community and to
maintain good contacts with the community leaders. This is outside the normal judicial role.” JOYCE PLOTNIKOFF & RICHARD
WOOLFSON, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SPECIALIST COURTS IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS (2005), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
research/2005/3_2005.pdf.
39. Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 1.
40. The identification of needs within a particular system has become
quite sophisticated in recent years. One example, called
Sequential Intercept Mapping Training, enables community representatives to create a map of how individuals with mental illnesses
move across the criminal justice (and treatment) systems. In turn,
this permits better planning for the allocation of assessment and
treatment resources, as well as the identification of gaps in services. Information about this training may be obtained at

http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/html/tta/trainings.asp.
41. There are many examples of judicial leadership in convening community stakeholders on these issues. One occurred in Miami,
Dade County, Florida, where the county was paying 16 million
dollars per year to house and treat people with mental illnesses in
the jail. Under the leadership of Judge Steve Leifman, a summit of
key stakeholders was convened; this in turn led to the creation of
Miami-Dade’s 11th Judicial Circuit Criminal Mental Health
Project under Judge Leifman’s leadership. The group, which continues to meet, has been instrumental in efforts to create systemic
responses to these issues. For a description, see http://
www.naco.org/CountyNewsTemplate.cfm?template=/ContentMan
agement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8091. In Broward
County, Florida, Judge Mark Speiser created a multiagency
Criminal Justice Mental Health Task Force in 1994. The Task
Force continues to meet and has spawned a number of initiatives,
including two mental-health courts (the first a misdemeanor
court, the second a felony court) and specialty probation. In Ohio,
Supreme Court Justice Evelyn Stratton has been a forceful advocate for the creation of mental-health courts, and, at least in part
as a result, Ohio has more mental-health courts than any state in
the United States. More recently, the Florida Supreme Court,
under Judge Leifman’s leadership, published a comprehensive
report suggesting reforms in both the mental-health and criminal
justice systems to provide better care for people with mental illnesses at risk of entering the criminal justice system. The report
can be found at http://mhlp.fmhi.usf.edu/web/mhlp/documents/
Supreme-Court-Report-2007.pdf.
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abuse diagnoses. Treatment is often lacking for people with cooccurring disorders in the general population, and so the lack
of adequate treatment capacity will be an issue confronting
therapeutically oriented judges as well.42
Given these difficulties, judges may find themselves a part of
an effort to create or design treatment and other services for
defendants. Certainly there is precedent for this; judges presiding over drug courts are often intimately involved in overseeing
treatment, and drug courts may operate services directly as well
as contract with other treatment providers.43 While a discussion
of appropriate treatment services for defendants with mental illnesses is beyond the scope of this article, a judge in this position might consider the following:
First, creation of the capacity to assess serious mentalhealth issues rapidly and effectively is important, clinically and
programmatically. From a clinical perspective, early assessment increases the chances for effective treatment to be provided. From a programmatic perspective, early assessment is
important in determining whether an individual is suited for a
particular intervention, for example, whether the individual
meets criteria governing admission to a mental-health court.
Therefore, the availability of good assessment services is critical, whether a community focuses on pre-arrest diversion,
therapeutic courts, or post-sentencing alternatives such as specialty probation.44
Second, the development of treatment services does not
occur in a scientific vacuum. In recent years, there has been a
move toward the use of “evidence-based practices” for treating
mental illnesses. Such practices are based on research and have
been described as “specific interventions and treatment models that have been shown to improve client functioning and the
course of severe mental illness.”45 According to the President’s
New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, a number of
treatments can be characterized as evidence-based practices,
including specific medications for specific conditions, cogni-

tive and interpersonal theraFrequently the
pies for depression, preventive interventions for chil- discussion is framed
dren at risk for serious emo- in terms of whether
tional disturbances, multi- the judiciary should
systemic therapy, parentbe expected to
child interaction therapy,
medication algorithms, fambehave in one
ily
psycho-education,
of two polarassertive community treatopposite ways.
ment, and collaborative
treatment in primary care.46
It should be noted that these treatments have not been proved
effective in treating every type of mental illness, and therefore
should not be adopted without first considering the clinical
profile of individuals that are the focus of an intervention.
However, they can provide a common frame of reference for
discussions between representatives of the criminal justice and
mental-health treatment systems.
Third, the use of “boundary spanners” seems essential to
cross-system collaboration. Henry Steadman describes boundary spanners as positions that link two or more systems whose
goals and expectations are at least partially conflicting.47
Specifically, an individual in a boundary-spanning position
manages the day-to-day interactions between the criminal justice and mental-health systems. Whether the person works for
the criminal justice system or the mental-health system is less
important than whether the person has authority to make decisions regarding interactions between the systems.48
The judge as advocate. Judges may not act as lobbyists for
ethical and legal reasons. However, judges increasingly play a
role as advocates for services to people with mental illnesses.
This role as advocate is a natural out-growth for a judge who
becomes a community leader on these issues or who presides
over a therapeutic court such as a mental-health court.

42. The President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health
found that individuals with co-occurring mental-illness and substance-abuse disorders are “treated for only one of the two disorders—if they are treated at all.” According to the Commission,
only 19% of individuals with serious co-occurring disorders
received treatment for both disorders, while 29% received treatment for neither. The Commission observed that such individuals
often use the most expensive forms of care, including hospital
emergency rooms and inpatient facilities, and that the lack of
treatment increased their risk for suicide attempts, violent behavior, legal problems, serious medical problems, and homelessness.
See ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 14.
43. For a good overall discussion of drug courts, including recidivism
and treatment issues, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS
AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf.
44. Rapid assessment has long been a benchmark of drug-court programs, and it is also considered critical in the treatment of mental
illnesses more generally. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG CT.
PROFESSIONALS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS
(1997 ed., reprinted 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

BJA/grant/DrugCourts/DefiningDC.pdf. See also ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE, supra note 14.
45. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT 251 (2002), available at http://consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire_report.pdf. Policy Statement No. 35 of
the consensus project report urges the use of evidence-based practices in mental-health treatment. Id. at 250-56.
46. ACHIEVING THE PROMISE, supra note 14, Goal 5. The development
of evidence-based practices is in an embryonic stage, and there is
not complete consensus on which treatments should be classified
as evidence-based practices. In addition, most jurisdictions rely
on a treatment system in which some or all such practices are
absent. This does not mean that treatment in such jurisdictions is
necessarily suspect in all cases; however, in developing services to
fill gaps in treatment, it seems useful to focus on evidence-based
practices as an anchor for discussion.
47. Henry J. Steadman, Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the
Effective Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems, 16
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 75 (1992).
48. Steadman notes that there is no best way to create a boundaryspanner position and that deciding where to place a boundaryspanner position “depends upon local politics, history, economics,
and personalities.” Id. at 84 n.23.
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An example of such advocacy, as part of a broader coalition
of stakeholders, is provided by the Florida Partners in Crisis.
This coalition was begun in central Florida in 1999 under the
leadership of Judge Belvin Perry in response to mental-health
and substance-use issues affecting the mental-health system.
Members include judges, law-enforcement officials, behavioral-health providers, correctional officials, and family members. Partners in Crisis has a number of goals, including
increasing public awareness of mental-health and substanceuse service needs throughout Florida.49
The emergence of organizations like Partners in Crisis is an
important development politically. For years, mental-health
providers, in particular, were suspicious of the legal system
and the courts for a variety of reasons including malpractice
concerns, and treatment providers also associated client
involvement in the legal process with long, uncompensated
hours spent waiting to testify. However, given declining financial support for mental-health services in many states, and
given the reality that law-enforcement officials typically have
more clout politically than mental-health providers, a coalition
such as Partners in Crisis has the potential to focus legislative
and executive branch attention on service needs in a way that
treatment providers, acting alone, often cannot.
The judge as a member of the treatment team. Finally,
therapeutic courts, in particular, require the judge to play a
role that may conflict with the more traditional role of the
judge. One commentator in this journal has written,
“Specialized courts…are manifestations of a change in the role
of the judge from ‘dispassionate, disinterested magistrate’ to
that of a ‘sensitive, emphatic counselor.”50 Justice Kaye, Chief
of the New York Court of Appeals, has observed that therapeutic courts require a change in the role of lawyers as well,
writing that in therapeutic courts, “the lawyers also have new
roles. The prosecution and defense are not sparring champions, they are members of a team with a common goal: Getting
the defendant off drugs. When this goal is attained, everyone
wins. Defendants win dismissal of their charges…the public
wins safer streets and reduced recidivism.”51
Others have criticized these roles on a number of grounds
including a claim that they may lead to the derogation of
important legal rights enjoyed by the defendant. As noted earlier, this conflict over judicial role is not new. Boldt, for example, has argued that the creation of a “therapeutic relationship”
between judge and defendant may compromise the role of
defense counsel, among other things.52

Indeed, these arguments over the appropriate role of judges
and lawyers have been at the heart of many of the debates
regarding such roles in the context of civil commitment.53 As
with other role issues discussed in this article, judges will
make individual decisions regarding the roles they wish to
play, but the potential role conflict is worth noting.
Judges are providing critical leadership in communities
across the United States in responding to the crisis of mental
illness in the criminal justice system. In doing so, judges have
adopted new and sometimes unfamiliar roles. While not all
judges are comfortable with these new roles, it seems clear that
in many instances, reform is simply impossible without judicial leadership.

49. For a description of Partners in Crisis and its membership and
activities, see http://www.flpic.org.
50. David Rottman, Does Effective Therapeutic Jurisprudence Require
Specialized Courts (And Do Specialized Courts Imply Specialist
Judges)?, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2000, at 22. Rottman provides an
excellent summary of the arguments for and against specialization. He concludes that “the long-term future of the new specialized courts depends upon their successful incorporation into
larger trial court systems…the investment of so many resources in
special courts must ultimately be justified in terms of their role as
agents of change beyond a few courtrooms.” Id. at 26.

51. Judith Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1998).
52. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Court
Treatment Movement, 76 WASHINGTON UNIV. L.Q. 1206 (1998).
53. The most used legal textbook on mental-disability law notes
“numerous studies have documented that attorneys rarely spend
more than a few minutes preparing for the [civil commitment]
hearing, seldom call witnesses, and usually fail to engage in vigorous cross-examination of the experts.” RALPH REISNER,
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 800 (4th ed. 2003).
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Cautions About Applying
Neuroscience to
Batterer Intervention
Edward Gondolf

R

esearchers have recently pointed out the high prevalence
of “intermittent explosive disorder” (IED) underlying
many of the violent outbursts in our society.1 They estimate that at least a third of domestic violence perpetrators, or
those we frequently refer to as “batterers,” are likely to suffer
from this disorder.2 This claim, along with a number of related
findings, appears to have implications for domestic violence
courts and judges’ decisions to mandate offenders to batterer
programs. The issue is that if this disorder is related to brain
activity that warrants medical treatment, then in many cases,
domestic violence offenders may be unresponsive to more conventional counseling and education efforts that typify batterer
intervention. The assertions about IED come from a rapidly
advancing line of research in neuroscience—that is, brain
activity and its association with behavior. The emerging concern is that the implications stemming from this research are
subject to misuse and overuse and therefore warrant some clarification and caution.3
NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Advances in neuroscience over the last decade are increasingly entering the courtroom. Specifically, research on the
brain has established associations between certain brain activity and outward behavior. Current brain activity has, in turn,
been traced to developmental experiences, such as traumatic
events in one’s past.4 The research has led to a broader and
more complex view of how individuals think and act, but it has
also raised questions about how to deal effectively with the
more violent offenders.5 Parts of the brain that regulate moral

reasoning and judgment, for instance, may not be sufficiently
or fully developed, and an individual with this type of brain
function may therefore be prone to violent outbursts. Brain
scans tend to corroborate this association. To what extent do
we, then, “blame the brain” for violent behavior and treat it in
the course of intervention? The implications of neuroscience
seem to be that medication that influences the brain’s activity,
or incarceration may be more appropriate than trying to persuade the person to change through conventional cognitivebehavior counseling. The latter may appeal to a reasoning
capacity that many violent offenders simply don’t have.
This view has immediate implications for so-called batterer
counseling or education programs used with men who are
arrested for domestic violence.6 These programs typically follow cognitive-behavioral approaches that prompt men to take
responsibility for their behavior. They imply that some “free
will” is possible in making a choice not to act violently toward
others. They also shift attention toward the well-being and
safety of the victim, rather than the men’s self-centered wants
and desires. Those who doubt the effectiveness of these programs are likely to see the implications of neuroscience as an
answer.7 Many men might not have the capacity to benefit
from such programs and may need biomedical treatment that
addresses their brain development or deficiencies.
The recent brain studies substantiate the diagnosis of “intermittent explosive disorder” (IED) to explain much of the
anger-filled violence in our society—from road rage to domestic violence.8 As the name suggests, intermittent explosive disorder is typified by outbursts of temper and violence that occur

Carol Warshaw, M.D., Domestic Violence and Mental Health Policy
Initiative; Barbara Hart, J.D., Battered Women Justice Project; Jennifer
Skeem, Ph.D., University of California at Irvine; and Marlene O’Leary,
M.S.W., Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, contributed advice,
comments, and discussion.
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2. Ronald Kotulak, Anger Attacks Common and Research Tells Why:
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(June 6, 2006), available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/chi-0606060117jun06,1,868023.story.
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in response to minimum provocation. A low-level of activity
appears in the cognitive and reasoning part of the brain, which
checks impulsive reactions. IED proponents argue that the biological and structural roots of violence warrant treatment along
the lines of hypertension or diabetes—that is, as a medical
problem, rather than treatment of character, beliefs, and
actions.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCERNS

The main concern in the legal field has been in the potential misuse and overuse of neuroscience research and its application in classifications like IED.9 The tendency among practitioners in general is to draw conclusions based on the bottom-line of research, which is complex, nuanced, and qualified. Most of the neuroscience researchers themselves caution
against this. One recent review of the applications of neuroscience concludes:
Neuroscience is increasingly identifying associations
between biology and violence that appear to offer courts
evidence relevant to criminal responsibility…. However,
there is a mismatch between questions that the courts
and society wish answered and those that neuroscience
is capable of answering. This poses a risk to the proper
exercise of justice and to civil liberties.10
A recently commissioned book on the topic, Neuroscience
and the Law, similarly questions using the implications of neuroscience in legal decision-making.11 It cautions that the law
assumes that individuals are responsible for their actions and
are capable of learning and abiding by the rules of society. The
assumption that an individual is not capable of these behaviors
enters an arena of competency that requires a stronger body of
evidence than is currently available in neuroscience.
Researchers themselves point out several limitations.12 How
the brain works and translates into “mind” is still a mystery.
The association between brain activity and violent behavior is
just that—an association and not necessarily a “cause.”
Moreover, the effectiveness of brain-related treatments is still
uncertain. Most researchers, including those promoting IED,
still acknowledge a role for cognitive-behavioral group counseling.13 The research does not therefore indicate replacing
current batterer counseling and education but raises additional
considerations and supplemental treatment for extreme cases.
In fact, proponents of IED acknowledge that conventional cognitive-behavioral approaches can assist and reinforce behavioral changes, but the focus of treatment does clearly shift
under IED assumptions.

9. Garland & Frankel, supra note 3.
10. Eastman & Campbell, supra note 3, at 31.
11. Garland & Frankel, supra note 3.
12. Goldberg, supra note 8.
13. Id.
14. Edward Gondolf, MCMI Results for Batterer Program Participants
in Four Cities: Less “Pathological” than Expected, 14 J. FAM. VIOL. 1
(1999).

QUESTIONS FOR BATTERER
INTERVENTION

The assertion that
as many as onethird of batterers
may be acting out
of IED seems high
in light of our
batterer research.

At the heart of the issue is
the extent of brain-related
problems like “intermittent
explosive disorder” among
domestic violence offenders
and the need for medically oriented treatments. Should most
batterers first go through an
extensive assessment for such
disorders and brain problems? Should batterer treatment be
delivered in medical settings or clinics that may recommend
counseling as a supplement to the medical treatment for violence? Or is it sufficient to keep batterer programs in the community with the possibility of additional referrals for extreme
behavioral problems?
The fundamental question is the numbers of men who
might be identified as having brain-related impairments that
warrant medical treatment in addition to, or instead of, batterer counseling or education. The assertion that as many as
one-third of batterers may be acting out of IED seems high in
light of our batterer research. In our court-mandated samples,
we found very little evidence of symptoms associated with
IED. A psychological test (Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory-III) administered to 864 batterers in four different
cities showed less than 10% having symptoms of impulsivity,
post-traumatic stress, or borderline disorders.14 We found
similar results using the Brief Symptoms Inventory (BSI) with
nearly 1,000 men in Pittsburgh.15 Moreover, approximately
two-thirds of the men who screened positive on the BSI for
psychological distresses, and received a clinical evaluation at a
major teaching hospital, were diagnosed with an adjustment
disorder requiring no further treatment. Only 5% received a
diagnosis related to impulse control. An additional study of
the women’s descriptions of violent incidents produced very
few cases in which the pattern of violent events could be characterized by independent outbursts or explosions of rage. 16
A practical issue is the resistance of court-ordered batterers
to comply with psychiatric or neurological evaluation and
treatment. Their resistance to such referrals appears in our
studies to be very high, and the ability and willingness of psychiatric clinics to supervise compliance seems low.17 Less than
a quarter (23%) of the men who were required to obtain mental-health referrals were actually evaluated; 15% were advised
to receive treatment; and 8% attended a treatment session.
Only 6% of voluntary referrals ever received an evaluation.
This low compliance rate, even under the mandated stipula-

15. Edward Gondolf, Implementation of Supplemental Psychological
Treatment for Batterer Program Participants, PAPER AT INT’L. ASS’N.
FOR. MENTAL HEALT SVCS., AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS (June 13-16,
2006).
16. Edward Gondolf & Angie Beeman, Women’s Accounts of Violence
Versus Tactics-Based Outcome Categories, 9 VIOL. AGAINST WOMEN
278 (2003).
17. Gondolf, supra note 15.
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tions, suggests the impracticality of sending men
directly to mental-health
treatment for evaluation.
Batterer programs typically
provide case supervision and
violence education, which
have much higher compliance rates. In our multi-site
evaluation of batterer intervention, over two-thirds of
the men completed a minimum of three months of
weekly sessions—resulting
in a 50% reduction in reassaults during a 15 month follow-up, according to the men’s
female partners.18

The brain-based
explanations for
violence may also
counter batterer
counseling . . . that
emphasize[s]
the need and
ability to . . . take
responsibility for
one’s behavior.

THE CASE FOR BATTERER COUNSELING

The case can certainly be made that the structured cognitivebehavioral approach is appropriate for the vast majority of the
men court-ordered to batterer programs. This approach is generally prescribed for individuals with narcissistic and antisocial
tendencies, and the majority of men in our studies show either
or both of these tendencies.19 The reviews of intervention
research, moreover, identify cognitive-behavioral approaches as
the most effective in dealing with violent criminals. 20
According to batterer-program evaluations, cognitive-behavioral approaches produce at least equivalent, and perhaps more
efficient, outcomes compared to other approaches or formats.21
The vast majority of men’s partners endorse these programs,
attribute the men’s change to them, and feel safer as a result.22
Additionally, victim advocates have raised concerns over
the implications of brain-based and pathological explanations
for domestic violence.23 The explanations appear to displace
the responsibility for the violence from the individual and reinforce batterers’ tendency to project blame and accountability.
Batterers frequently play out this displacement of responsibility in their presentation of violent incidents.24 They describe
themselves as losing control or “snapping” to make the violence appear accidental or to minimize a constellation of
abuse. Without corroborating information carefully gathered

18. Edward Gondolf & Alison Jones, The Program Effect of Batterer
Programs in Three Cities, 16 VIOL. VICT. 693 (2001); Alison Jones
et al., Assessing the Effect of Batterer Program Completion on
Reassault Using Propensity Scores, 19 J. INT’L VIOL. 1002 (2004).
19. Robert White & Edward Gondolf, Implications of Personality
Profiles for Batterer Treatment: Support for the Gender-Based,
Cognitive-Behavioral Approach, 15 J. INT’L VIOL. 467 (2000).
20. Frank Pearson et al., The Effects of Behavioral/Cognitive-Behavioral
Programs on Recidivism, 4 CRIME DELINQ. 476 (2002).
21. Edward Gondolf, A Comparison of Reassault Rates in Four Batterer
Programs: Do Court Referral, Program Length and Services Matter?,
14 J. INT’L VIOL. 41 (1999); Daniel Saunders, Feminist-CognitiveBehavioral and Process-Psychodynamic Treatments for Men Who
Batter: Interaction of Abuser Traits and Treatment Models, 11 VIOL.
VICT. 393 (1996).
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from victims, what appears like IED may be a form of narcissistic or antisocial manipulation.
The brain-based explanations for violence may also counter
batterer counseling or education programs that emphasize the
need and ability to acknowledge and take responsibility for
one’s behavior.25 In the cognitive-behavioral approaches, this
acknowledgment is considered a key step toward the motivation and empowerment necessary to create change. The pathological explanations, furthermore, naively shift the focus from
the institutional and social supports that reinforce—if not promote—domestic violence and the need to address the socialized beliefs, attitudes, and expectations that underlie domestic
violence. There is much more to violence than “he just snaps.”
Even violent outbursts associated with IED might be reduced
if the expectations that cause frustration were lowered or
changed.
Neuroscience has done much to elaborate the development
of behavior over time and to confirm the impact of childhood
experiences on adult behavior. Questions remain as to the
centrality of brain activity in determining behavior and the
malleability of behavior. An analogous controversy has
emerged over “attention deficient and hyperactivity disorder”
(ADHD).26 One side has promoted the use of drugs like Ritalin
to alter the brain activity underlying the problem, while opponents argue that the ADHD diagnosis and its assumptions have
been overused and misused for a problem that has primarily
social roots and corrections.27 Interestingly, several books by
psychiatrists, psychologists, and researchers are now exploring
the development of aggression, bullying, and violence in
boys.28 The consensus of these experts is that social messages,
interactions, images, and roles pressed on boys today warrant
our primary attention. Our best intervention is ultimately to
help boys and young men recognize and counter the socialization and social pressures that result in aggression and violence.
The implication is that we need to do the same with adult men
as well.
CAUTIONS FOR THE COURTS

The point here is for the courts to be cautious about applying the implications of neuroscientific research at this stage. As
another article examining the advances of neuroscience concludes: “From the legal and research perspective, available

22. Edward Gondolf & Robert White, “Consumer” Recommendations
for Batterer Programs, 6 VIOL. AGAINST WOMEN 196 (2000).
23. LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT? INSIDE THE MINDS OF
ANGRY AND CONTROLLING MEN (2002). See also Lundy Bancroft,
The Parenting of Men Who Batter, COURT REVIEW, Summer 2002, at
44.
24. Kris Henning & Robert Holdford, Minimization, Denial, and
Victim Blaming by Batterers: How Much Does the Truth Matter, 33
CRIM. JUS. BEHAV. 110 (2006).
25. Id.
26. WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL BOYS: RESCUING OUR SONS FROM THE MYTHS
OF BOYHOOD (1998); DAN KINDLON & MICHAEL THOMPSON, RAISING
CAIN: PROTECTING THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF BOYS (2000).
27. Id.
28. Cellini, supra note 4.

findings (regarding neuroscience) must be viewed as preliminary at best, and caution must be exercised so the information
is not inappropriately applied from general findings to a specific case.”29 In sum, it makes sense for now to continue to
refer men to batterer programs and reinforce their compliance
with this programming through supervision and sanctions,
much as has been established in the “drug court” model.30
Batterer programs obviously need to send men with problems
of explosive rage, depression, and alcohol abuse for additional
evaluation and treatment. But most importantly, interventions
need to better contain men who do not comply to batterer programs or those who re-offend, and provide more protection
and safety planning for their victims. The striking finding in
our batterer intervention research has been the apparent failure
of the intervention system to restrain repeat offenders and the
most violent offenders, which allows them to continue getting
away with it.
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Breaking News:
Miller is Distinguishable from Branzburg
Levon Q. Schlichter

A

midst a fog of political divisiveness, Judith Miller
found herself in the untenable situation of having to
breach the journalists’ code of ethics, as well as her
own personal promise of confidentiality, or go to jail.
According to the government, she had obtained illegally disclosed information from a high-ranking member of President
George W. Bush’s administration. Eventually, a grand jury
issued Miller a subpoena that directed her to breach her
promise of confidentiality by revealing the identity of her
source. Miller claimed that she had a First Amendment right
to withhold her confidential information from the grand jury.
The court disagreed and, although she never published the
information, Miller was sent to jail as punishment for protecting her source.
If nothing else, Judith Miller’s 85-day-prison term put
America on notice of the alarming rate at which the government is using its unbridled subpoena power to splinter the
press’s traditional role as the public’s government watchdog. In
fact, the government is currently issuing subpoenas upon
members of the press at a rate unmatched in at least 30 years.1
Additionally, the length of time that reporters are being held in
prison, as punishment for honoring their covenant of confidentiality, is increasing at a similarly astonishing pace.2
Remarkably, the outcome of Judith Miller’s case could only
encourage the government to subpoena reporters in droves.3
As the government is steadily increasing its use of subpoenas
on reporters, the press’s ability to gather and disseminate information of public concern is simultaneously weakening.4
Arguably, the scope of a reporter’s privilege should directly
correlate with the nature of the proceeding through which the
movant attempts to compel disclosure. Courts generally adhere
to this principle, reasoning that the moving party’s countervailing interests differ in degree between civil, criminal, and grand
jury proceedings. For instance, in a criminal proceeding, the
movant/defendant who seeks to compel disclosure from a
reporter has countervailing Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
to this information.5 Conversely, a movant/defendant who
seeks to compel disclosure from a reporter in a civil proceeding

does not have a competing constitutional right to the information.6 Thus, a reporter’s privilege is generally broader in civil
proceedings than in criminal ones.
Interestingly, the efficacy of a grand jury’s right to compel a
reporter to disclose confidential information falls somewhere
between the criminal and civil contexts. In our society, the
grand jury “serves the invaluable function . . . of standing
between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether
a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”7 Although a
grand jury is constitutionally mandated, it does not have a
constitutional right to a reporter’s confidential information.8
Thus, this article will explore only the proper scope of a
reporter’s privilege to withhold confidential information from
a grand jury.
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MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 25, 2004, at A3 (reporting two examples of

sources refusing to provide newsworthy information out of fear
that a subpoena would disclose their identity).
5. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st
Cir. 1988).
6. Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. App. 1981).
7. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.23 (1972).
8. Karl H. Schmid, Reporter’s privilege in Criminal Proceedings: An
Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to
1999, at 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1499 (2002).
9. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
10. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
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I. OVERVIEW
A. The Supreme Court’s Analysis

Branzburg v. Hayes9 is the only Supreme Court case that has
precisely addressed the scope of a reporter’s privileged right to
withhold confidential information from a grand jury. In
Branzburg, the majority held that, absent a showing that the
grand jury is conducting a bad-faith investigation, the First
Amendment does not vitiate a reporter’s legal obligation to testify in front of a grand jury.10
In Branzburg, the Court consolidated three separate cases
where the reporters were asserting their right to withhold
privileged information from a grand jury investigation. In all
three of the cases, the reporters’ ability to gather news of public concern was conditioned on the reporters’ promise to keep
certain information confidential. In the first case, the grand
jury was seeking to compel disclosure of the reporter’s source
after two separate stories were published; the first story was
about the illegal synthesizing of hashish from marijuana and
the second story reported on the local drug scene. In the
other two consolidated cases, the grand juries were seeking to
compel the reporters to disclose information about the suspected illegal activity of the Black Panther Party. After hear-

ing these three separate cases below, the outcomes in the circuit courts were inconsistent and, thus, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.11
Writing for the majority in Branzburg, Justice White held
that, absent a showing of bad faith or harassment by the grand
jury, the Constitution does not grant a reporter any privilege to
withhold information from a grand jury investigation. Justice
White premised the Court’s conclusion on the notion that
rejecting the reporters’ privilege would not forbid or restrict the
press’s use of confidential sources.12 Accordingly, the Court did
not review the reporter’s claim under heightened scrutiny.
Initially, the Court articulated the dual purpose of a grand
jury within our government. First, a grand jury must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a suspected person has committed a crime; and, second, it is
designed to protect innocent citizens from “unfounded criminal prosecution.”13 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
grand juries are both constitutionally mandated and deeply
“rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history.”14
Therefore, according to the Court, a grand jury’s investigative
powers are necessarily broad, including its ability to subpoena
witnesses material to its task.
After providing this backdrop, the majority rejected the
reporters’ contention that denying them a First Amendment
privilege to protect confidential sources would significantly
deter informants from providing reporters with confidential
information in the future. Specifically, the majority explained
that the reporters’ proffered evidence in support of their
asserted privilege merely showed that reporters rely on confidential sources and not that the majority’s holding would
unconstitutionally chill future informants from disclosing confidential information. Furthermore, the Court stated that the
data was unpersuasive because it included opinion polls on
this subject, which were highly speculative and completed by
self-serving reporters. Thus, the Court concluded, “We doubt
if the informer who prefers anonymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of crime will always or very often
be deterred by the prospect of dealing with those public
authorities characteristically charged with the duty to protect
the public interest as well as his.”15 Ultimately, the Court
found that it did not need to recognize a reporter’s privilege in
order to protect the press’s ability to gather news and, therefore, the press’s right to withhold information from a grand
jury was no greater than an average citizens.
Alternatively, Justice Stewart’s dissent proposed a classic
balancing test designed to ensure that every reporter’s assertion
of a constitutional privilege is determined on the facts of the
case. The dissent’s balancing test proposed that, before
attempting to compel a reporter to disclose confidential information to a grand jury, the government must:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that

11. Id. at 679.
12. Id. at 681.
13. Id. at 686-87.
14. Id. at 687, 690 (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 695.

the newsman has information that is clearly
relevant to a specific
probable violation of
law; (2) demonstrate
that the information
sought
cannot
be
obtained by alternative
means less destructive
of First Amendment
rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in
the information.16
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faith or harassment
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Therefore, the dissent’s
approach differed from the majority’s because it opined that
limiting the scope of the reporters’ privilege to cases of bad
faith or harassment would unconstitutionally infringe on the
press’s First Amendment right to gather news.
Similarly, the dissent contended that the majority’s rule
would cause future confidential informants to withhold information from the press. Justice Stewart’s dissent emphasizes
the notion that a flexible reporter’s privilege is necessary to
protect the newsgathering process and, thus, to promote the
free flow of information that the First Amendment was meant
to ensure. In contrast to the majority, Justice Stewart believed
that the Court’s limitation of a reporter’s privilege would have
a significant chilling effect, thereby suppressing the free flow
of information.
Notably, Justice Powell wrote a concurrence to “emphasize
what seem[ed] to [him] to be the limited nature of the Court’s
holding.”17 According to Justice Powell, the Branzburg holding was not as formalistically rigid as it may appear. Instead,
Justice Powell stated that a reporter has a remedy against compelled grand jury testimony where the reporter asserts any one
of the following claims: (1) the grand jury is conducting its
investigation in bad faith; (2) the reporter’s confidential information has too remote and tenuous a relationship to the grand
jury’s investigation; or (3) “if [the reporter] has some other
reason to believe that his testimony implicates [a] confidential
source relationship without a legitimate need of law enforcement.”18 According to Justice Powell’s concurrence, if the
reporter asserts one of these claims, then the court must balance the reporter’s freedom of press interest against the “obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct.”19
B. The Judith Miller Case

Three decades after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Branzburg, the United States Court of Appeals for the District

16. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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of Columbia Circuit heard In
re: Grand Jury Subpoena,
Judith Miller.20 In actuality,
the events leading up to
Miller began when Joseph
Wilson, a former ambassador
of the United States, wrote a
New York Times op-ed piece
claiming that President Bush
knowingly
misled
the
American public about the
presence of weapons of mass
destruction
in
Iraq.21
Apparently, in an attempt to
discredit Wilson, someone within the White House informed
members of the press, including Miller, that Wilson’s wife,
Valerie Plame, was a CIA agent.22 Thereafter, the Chicago SunTimes reported Plame’s identity in an article that challenged the
accuracy of Wilson’s conclusions.23
In response, a grand jury subpoenaed Judith Miller in order
to determine whether a government agent had illegally disclosed Plame’s identity as a CIA official. Interestingly, Miller
had not even published the information the grand jury
sought.24 In any event, she refused to comply with the grand
jury subpoena and, therefore, the district court held her in
contempt of court. Miller challenged the grand jury’s power to
compel disclosure of this information as a violation of her First
Amendment rights. Significantly, Miller’s First Amendment
challenge required the court to revisit Branzburg.
The majority began its opinion by observing that Branzburg
controlled Judith Miller’s First Amendment claim and that, in
Branzburg, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that the
First Amendment does not provide a reporter’s privilege,
absent a showing of bad faith or harassment.25 Thus, the
Miller court pressed the reporter to distinguish her case from
Branzburg. The reporter failed to offer any distinguishing
facts, and even upon independent contemplation the Miller
court was unable to find an adequate distinction. Instead, the

reporter contended that the Constitution protected her from
testifying in front of the grand jury because Branzburg was a
plurality decision and, therefore, Justice Powell’s concurrence
was binding. However, the Miller court adamantly rejected the
reporter’s argument and concluded that Justice Powell both
joined and agreed with the majority’s decision.26
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tatel concluded that
Branzburg merely foreclosed the reporter’s privilege pursuant
to the First Amendment. However, he quoted language in
Branzburg that recognized Congress’s power to enact a qualified statutory reporter’s privilege.27 Thus, he concluded that
Branzburg did not intend to absolutely foreclose a reporter’s
protection from compelled disclosure, absent a showing of bad
faith or harassment. Furthermore, Tatel stated that after
Branzburg, Congress enacted Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which created a qualified reporter’s privilege.28
Judge Tatel proposed that “reason and experience dictate a
[qualified] privilege for reporters’ confidential sources.”29
First, he noted that “reporters ‘depend upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust.’”30 Therefore, denying a qualified privilege would create a chilling effect. Second, Tatel contended
that the resulting benefit of denying any qualified privilege
would be modest. Lastly, he stated that legal developments
since Branzburg, including the trend among the states towards
recognizing a reporter’s privilege, provided a basis to depart
from Branzburg.
Notably, Tatel recognized the fact that the information
sought by the grand jury related to an illegal “leak of information” rather than the commission of an extrinsic crime.31
Moreover, Tatel concluded that there are circumstances where
a reporter’s ability to obtain illegally disclosed information
would be in the public’s interest. Thus, for public policy reasons, where a qualified reporter’s privilege is at issue, it is necessary for courts to balance the interests between the reporter
and the government. According to Tatel, where the subject of
the grand jury investigation concerns illegally disclosed information, the harm and news value of the leak are the dispositive factors. In conclusion, Tatel stated that “were the leak at

20. 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Miller]. The opinion
was initially issued in 2005 with substantial redactions because of
its discussion of national security materials. In re: Grand Jury
Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005). As
explained in a separate opinion a year later in which the court
concluded some of the redacted material could then be made public, the opinion was reissued with additional pages included,
though some materials were still redacted. This article cites to the
reissued opinion. In between Branzburg and Miller the circuit
courts had applied the Branzburg rule inconsistently. Compare
Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th
Cir. 1987) (ordering reporter to disclose to a grand jury the identity of a confidential source who was suspected of murder), and
Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974) (ordering
reporter to reveal information to a grand jury relating to the
bombing of a government building), with In re: Williams, 766
F.Supp. 358, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d by an equally divided court,
963 F.2d 567, 569 (3d Cir. 1992) (quashing a grand jury subpoena
that sought identity of the reporter’s source who violated a court

order by providing the reporter with copies of documents used as
evidence in a criminal trial).
21. Joseph C. Wilson, Op-Ed, What I Didn’t Find In Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
July, 6, 2003, § 4, at 9.
22. Nancy Gibbs, The Rove Problem, TIME, July 25, 2005, at 22.
23. Robert Novak, The Mission to Niger, CHI SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003,
at 31.
24. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1144.
25. Id. at 1146-47.
26. Id. at 1148-49.
27. Id. at 1163-83 (Tatel, J., concurring).
28. Rule 501 became effective June 1, 1975 and provides in relevant
part: “Privilege[s]…shall be governed by the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.” FED. R. EVID. 501.
29. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1166 (Tatel, J., concurring) (quoting Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S 1, 14 (1996)).
30. Id. at 1168 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 1169.
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[A] narrow
reporter’s privilege
will not
significantly
impede on a
grand jury’s
function of
prosecuting
extrinsic
crimes . . . .

issue in [Miller] less harmful
to national security or more
vital to public debate, or had
the grand jury’s special counsel failed to demonstrate its
need for the reporter’s evidence” he might have felt
compelled to grant Miller’s
motion to quash the subpoena.32
II. DISCUSSION

The following discussion
attempts to illustrate how and
why Branzburg should not
control cases that, like Miller, deal with “illegal disclosures of
confidential government information.” Initially, it distinguishes Miller from Branzburg based on the nature of the
reporters’ information. Relying on this distinction, it contends
that the First Amendment protects a reporter from disclosing
the identity of a confidential government-agent informant. In
addition, it proposes a reporter’s privilege whose scope is
guided by the public’s interest in the reporters’ information and
concludes that this approach is the best way to strike a balance
between the competing constitutional interests of the government and the press. It then examines Branzburg’s reasoning
against Miller’s facts to support the logic of its distinction.
Lastly, this section applies its proposed rule to current conflicts
between the press and the government in order to demonstrate
its propriety.

Branzburg because a First Amendment reporter’s privilege to
withhold only the identity of confidential government-agent
informants will particularly foster the detection of governmental misconduct. 36 Additionally, such a narrow reporter’s privilege will not significantly impede on a grand jury’s function of
prosecuting extrinsic crimes, which was of paramount concern
in Branzburg.
Quoting Branzburg, the Miller court reasoned that a
reporter’s attempt to conceal a crime, via an assertion of a
reporter’s privilege, is unconditionally outweighed by a grand
jury’s good-faith interest in punishing the crime.37 However,
this reasoning is misplaced in the context of “illegal disclosure
of confidential government information” because it does not
consider the nature of the information. This distinction is necessary because “information generated from press reports
about government, serves as a ‘powerful antidote to any abuses
of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.’
”38 Therefore, the scope of a reporter’s privilege should protect
reporters from compelled disclosure of their confidential government-agent informants, provided that the information
properly relates to an abuse of government power.
B. The First Amendment Provides a Qualified
Reporter’s Privilege

Despite the Miller court’s conclusory pronouncement that
the case was indistinguishable from Branzburg, the very nature
of the information sought in the two cases is distinguishable.33
The confidential information sought in Branzburg was evidence containing the identity of self-purported drug dealers
and drug users and the suspected illegal activity of a radical
minority group.34 On the other hand, the information sought
in Miller related to the identity of a government official who
was suspected of unlawfully leaking information regarding
government activity.35 Thus, Miller is distinguishable from

It is axiomatic that the purpose of the First Amendment is
to protect the public against the government’s control of
thoughts, behavior, and expression.39 The text of the First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or, of the press.”40 Various
interpretations of the disjunctive “or” have ranged from claims
that it does not create any additional rights beyond freedom of
speech to claims that the Press Clause provides the press with
“special rights.”41 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to
recognize that the First Amendment’s disjunctive “or” creates
special protections for the press.
Undeniably, the function of the press is to gather and disseminate information. Within this raison d’etre, “the press’s
most important [role] is to [gather and disseminate information about] the government.”42 The press’s ability to obtain
confidential information from government officials is unques-

32. Id. at 1183.
33. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Branzburg Revisited:
Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 13, 14 n.7 (1988) (contending that Branzburg should not
apply, at the very least, to cases where the reporter’s information
relates to the identity of a confidential government-agent source).
34. This is evidence which would likely help the grand jury to prosecute the perpetrators of an extrinsic crime.
35. This is evidence of the identity of a government-agent informant,
where the only crime the grand jury is seeking to prosecute is, in
fact, the informant’s disclosure of confidential information.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1147.
38. Langley & Levine, supra note 33, at 34 (quoting Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218-219 (1966)).

39. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255-57 (1961).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. See generally, John H. F. Shattuck & Fritz Byers, An Egalitarian
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
377, 377 (1981) (discussing various interpretations of the disjunctive within the First Amendment). Some scholars have settled on a middle ground, taking the position that the Constitution
does not provide the press with “extraordinary constitutional protection” but that it does require courts to be more protective of the
press’s special responsibilities within our society. See e.g.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 976 (2d ed.
1988).
42. In re Ridenhour, 520 So.2d 372, 376 (La. 1988). Thus, the press
is often referred to as the Fourth Estate. Id. at n.14.

A. Distinguishing Miller from Branzburg

186 Court Review - Volume 43

tionably its most effective means for providing the public with
information about government activity.43 Accordingly, the
press must have a right to keep the identity of their official
government sources confidential in order to elicit information
pertaining to otherwise inaccessible government activity. In
this sense, “a press right to gather information is compatible
with the concept of freedom of the press understood by many
politicians and political theorists of the early American republic.”44
Notably, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech
Clause broadly in order to vehemently protect an individual’s
right to freedom of expression. Most often, whenever the
Court extends First Amendment protection, it relies on the
notion that “public discussion and debate of issues, and criticism and investigation of public bodies are essential to a free
society.”45 However, the ability to freely express oneself is
severely impaired without the constitutionally protected right
of reporters to obtain confidential government information
that will likely influence public opinion. In fact, the many
Supreme Court cases emphasizing the importance of an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail” implicitly rely on the speakers’ ability to obtain information that will influence their assessment of the truth.46 Thus,
protection of a reporter’s right to gather (and subsequently
publish) confidential information is required under the First
Amendment in order to protect the sanctity of our self-governing process.
C. A Proposed Qualified Privilege with Respect to
Confidential Government Sources

This article proposes a narrow rule that does not purport to
grant reporters an absolute privilege in every case where a
reporter has obtained illegally disclosed, confidential information from a government agent. Instead, where a reporter has
received confidential information from a government-agent
informant, the reporter should have a qualified privilege that
protects him or her from compelled disclosure only where the
reporter establishes the following two conditions: (1) the dis-

43. Shattuck & Byers, supra note 39, at 384-85.
44. Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After
Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 174 (1975). However,
this right does not necessarily amount to a “special right.” See
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the
Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 328 (2004) (recognizing
“some right . . . for information-gathering activities to a manageable subset of our society that the general public relies on to
gather and disseminate important information to it [should be
determined] by focusing on the recognized functions that certain
groups perform for society, instead of on the perceived inequities
in allowing some groups to invoke constitutional rights not available to individual citizens”).
45. James A. Guest & Alan L. Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 N.W. L. REV. 18, 30 (1969).
46. Comment, supra note 44, at 175.
47. The term “possible government misconduct” is intended to
include not only allegations that the government has violated an
existing criminal or civil law but also situations where the government is acting secretly under a claim of authority that is sus-
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punish, was in the public’s
interest.
Notably, this proposed rule is similar to the standard that
the Supreme Court implemented to define the scope of a presidential privilege in United States v. Nixon.48 Applying this
standard to Miller is logical because “any privilege of access to
governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint
dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing
interests in security or confidentiality.”49 Therefore, a reporter
should have a privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential, government-agent informant from a grand jury in the limited situations where the privilege advances the public’s First
Amendment interest in facilitating an effective process of selfgovernment.50
Admittedly, the second prong of this proposed standard is
difficult to clearly define and, therefore, it does not appear to
provide a substantial degree of guidance for all interested parties. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has relied similarly on
a “national/public security” limitation in First Amendment
cases51 as well as in other areas of law.52 Furthermore, as long
as courts insist that the government’s “threat to national security” claim is asserted with the same level of specificity as the

pect. See infra notes 82-89 for examples of recent events where
the government has acted under a suspect claim of authority.
48. 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). Thus, the president has a First
Amendment privilege to withhold confidential information from a
court only where disclosure of the information would be “injurious to the public interest.” Id. at 713.
49. Langley & Levine, supra note 33, at 38-39 (quoting Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
50. In Nixon, the Supreme Court stated that the scope of a presidential privilege is necessarily determined by a rule which preserves
the essential function of each competing branch of government.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707. Considering that the press has been recognized as the fourth branch of government, the same reasoning
should apply to the scope of a reporter’s privilege. See Ridenhour,
520 So. 2d at 376 n.14 (explaining that the press’s role of watching the government is analogous to the function of a fourth
branch of government).
51. See e.g. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
52. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507 (2005); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
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reporter’s claim of “possible government misconduct,” then
certain underlying principles will emerge to help clarify the
second prong’s limitations. Most importantly, however, the difficulty in administering this proposed rule is not an adequate
reason for abandoning well-established First Amendment
objectives.
Notably, the Branzburg Court rejected an application of
heightened scrutiny because it would have required courts to
“distinguish [. . .] between the value of enforcing different
criminal laws.”53 The Court stated that “[b]y requiring testimony from a reporter in investigations involving some crimes
but not in others, [courts] would be making a value judgment
that a legislature had declined to make . . . .”54 However, this
proposed rule applies only to “illegal disclosures of information.”55 Accordingly, the proposed scope of this reporter’s privilege is not controlled by the classification of the underlying
crime that the grand jury is investigating, but rather is controlled by the public value of the illegal disclosure.
Considering that this proposed rule is designed to prevent the
government from abusing its power, Branzburg’s approach of
blindly deferring to the other branches of government is
patently ineffective.
D. Applying Branzburg’s Reasoning to Miller’s Facts

Preliminarily, Branzburg recognized that reporters have certain First Amendment rights to gather news.56 Unfortunately,
however, the Branzburg Court failed to elaborate on the extent
of those rights and as a result it appears to propose that a
reporter’s constitutionally protected right to withhold confidential information exists only where the grand jury’s interests
stem from bad faith or harassment. However, “[if] . . .
Branzburg only requires balancing where a grand jury subpoena is issued in bad faith or for purpose of harassment, no
balancing test would ever be required: [Any individual’s] legitimate First Amendment interest would always outweigh a subpoena issued in bad faith or harassment.57 Therefore, a strict
interpretation of the Branzburg majority’s rule, which the
Miller court applied, results in an illusory rule that pretends to
provide a reporter with protection from compelled disclosure
in form, but provides little protection in function.58
Accordingly, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion logically, as
he expressed, clarified and broadened the majority’s scope of a
reporter’s privilege.

53. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705-6.
54. Id.
55. Considering that the rule applies only to grand jury subpoenas, it
follows that this rule would apply only to communications
between reporters and their sources that the government alleges
are illegal.
56. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
57. The New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F.Supp.2d 457, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
58. See Newsmen’s Privilege to Withhold Information from Grand Jury,
86 HARV. L. REV. 137, 144 n.37 (1972) [hereinafter Newsmen’s
Privilege] (recognizing that a reporter’s ability to prove bad faith is
seemingly illusory because a reporter is not likely to have access
to this evidence until after the grand jury has completed its investigation).
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purpose of protecting the
public’s interest. Interestingly, based on these factors, Branzburg’s
reasoning is misplaced in the context of the Miller facts.
First, the Branzburg Court rejected the reporters’ First
Amendment claim by relying heavily on the notion that “the
case did not present an issue of restricting the press from using
confidential sources.”59 In fact, in the process of rejecting the
proposition that the First Amendment “protects a newsman’s
agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his source,”60 the
Court noted that this conclusion “involves no restraint on . . .
the type or quality of information reporters may seek to
acquire, nor does it threaten the vast bulk of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources.”61 In reaching
this conclusion, the Branzburg Court found that the reporters’
empirical data did not prove that its decision would have a significant deterrent effect on the press’s future ability to obtain
confidential information. Instead, it merely showed that
reporters rely on confidential informants. Nevertheless, the
Branzburg Court did acknowledge that its rule would impose
an incidental burden on the press’s ability to gather news.62
Notwithstanding this undetermined burden, the Court presumed that without evidence proving otherwise, its decision
would not unconstitutionally chill the newsgathering process.
However, if one can accept the following four assumptions,
then Branzburg improperly presumed that a denial of any
reporter’s privilege, absent a showing of bad faith or harassment, does not create a chilling effect:63 (1) reporters rely on
informants for news;64 (2) many informants will not provide a
reporter with information unless the reporter promises to keep
their identity confidential;65 (3) the use of unbridled subpoena

59. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 681 (emphasis added).
60. This language implies that the Branzburg Court’s decision was
heavily influenced by the fact that the reporters’ information
could aid the grand jury’s investigation of an extrinsic crime.
Langley & Levine, supra note 33, at 20.
61. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691-92.
62. Id. at 695.
63. Joan Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the
Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. 57, 64-65 (1985).
64. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94.
65. See e.g. Newsmen’s Privilege, supra note 58, at 147 (noting that
there is significant evidence which shows that reporters extensively rely on confidential informants).
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power will deter informants
from disclosing confidential
information;66 and (4) the use
of unbridled subpoena power
will deter reporters from publishing confidential information.67 Even assuming that the
existing data does not
absolutely refute Branzburg’s
presumption, common sense
suggests that the Branzburg
presumption was backwards
because, all things being equal, an informant is more likely to
provide a reporter with confidential information where the
reporter promises that the informant’s identity will remain
anonymous.68 Consequently, Branzburg’s decision to compel
the reporters to disclose their confidential information does
burden the press’s ability to gather news.69
Moreover, the quantum of evidence that Branzburg
demands from the reporters in order to overcome its presumption is unattainable because it is almost impossible to quantify
the deterrent effect.70 Similarly, “the magnitude of the [burden] a privilege imposes on [the courts’] truth-seeking [function] depends on exactly the same empirically unverified factor that determines the benefit gained by a privilege: namely,
the extent to which people would communicate in the absence
of the privilege.”71 Although this empirical data is nonexistent, there is increasingly more evidence of specific instances
where Branzburg’s deterrent effect has burdened the press’s
ability to gather and report news.72 This evidence demonstrates that the deterrent effect manifests itself most prominently between reporters and government-agent informants.73
Thus, Branzburg’s rule imposes a burden on the press’s right to
gather news; however, this burden is constitutionally significant only where it adversely affects the press’s ability to gather
information about possible government misconduct.
Second, Branzburg rejected the reporters’ privilege in order
to protect the grand jury’s purpose of aiding in the detection of
criminal activity. According to Branzburg, the grand jury’s ability to fully perform this function ultimately helps to protect the

[T]he quantum of
evidence that
Branzburg
demands from the
reporters in order
to overcome its
presumption is
unattainable . . . .

66. See e.g. Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A
Moral, Legal, and Civic Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 573, 587-88 (2005) (concluding that modern day restrictions on a reporter’s privilege have a “censoring effect . . . about
matters of vital public concern”).
67. See e.g. Modes of Analysis: The Theories and Justifications of
Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1985)
[hereinafter Modes of Analysis] (contending that an absolute
denial of a reporter’s privilege will deter reporters from gathering
confidential information).
68. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1168 (Tatel, J., concurring).
69. See Erik W. Laursen, Putting Journalists on Thin Ice: McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 293, 316 (2004) (noting that empirical data shows that subpoenas are burden to newsgathering).
70. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 43, at 43 n.129.
71. Modes of Analysis, supra note 67, at 1477.
72. See e.g. Robert D. McFadden, Newspaper Withholding Two Articles
After Jailing, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at § A (reporting that two
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public’s security. However, when the reporter’s information
relates to issues involving government misconduct, recognizing a reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources furthers the detection of wrongdoing.74 Hence, the proposed rule
set forth here attempts to provide a reporter’s privilege only
where it will not run contrary to the public’s security interest.
Meanwhile, if a reporter’s privilege does not threaten the public’s security, then it is presumably advancing the public’s interest in a free-flow of information, which facilitates our self-governing process.
E. An Actual Demonstration of How This Proposed
Rule Can Co-exist with Branzburg to Clarify the
Precise Scope of a Reporter’s First Amendment
Privilege

Indeed, Branzburg’s rule is appropriate in the arena of the
facts in which it was decided because a grand jury’s interest in
prosecuting extrinsic crimes undoubtedly outweighs reporters’
interest in protecting the identity of their confidential, nongovernment sources. Therefore, notwithstanding the contention that Branzburg does cause a chilling effect, its reasoning should support a grand jury’s unbridled subpoena power
only where the grand jury seeks information relating to an
extrinsic crime. However, Branzburg should not apply where a
reporter obtains confidential information from a governmentagent informant for the following three reasons. First, government abuse is an evil that must be curtailed through media
exposure.75 Second, secrecy within the government has
steadily increased since Branzburg.76 Third, government misconduct is unlikely to be disclosed to reporters without the
reporters’ legitimate ability to promise confidentiality.77
Notably, Branzburg’s analysis explicitly considered the
effects that its rule would have only on the relationship
between minority groups (informants) and reporters. In
doing so, the Court “[bespoke] a palpable focus upon both
the confidential source at issue—i.e. dissident political or cultural groups, and the [extrinsic] crimes that they had
allegedly committed.”78 Thus, Branzburg concluded that
denying the reporters’ asserted privilege was unlikely to deter
informants from disclosing confidential information to the

“profoundly important” stories of “significant interest to the public” were not published solely out of fear that the reporter would
be subpoenaed); Sutel, supra note 4, at A3 (reporting two examples where fear of a subpoena deterred source).
73. Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a
Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J 317, 332 (1970) (citing affidavit of Newsweek reporter Jon Lowell).
74. Schmid, supra note 8, at 1463.
75. Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out For the Watchdogs: A
Legislative Proposal Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to
Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources and
Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 106 (2002).
76. See Gonzales, 382 F.Supp. 2d at 462 n.3 (noting that in 2001 the
number of classified government documents reportedly rose
18%).
77. Langley & Levine, supra note 33, at 45.
78. Id. at 20.

press because the informants are “members of a minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propagate its views . . . .”79 Evidently, Branzburg did not expressly
consider the deterrent effects that its rule may have on the
relationship between government-agent informants and
reporters.
Applying the proposed rule to the Miller case presents a
unique challenge. It appears that the press’s publication of
Valerie Plame’s identity did in fact impair our government’s
national security efforts because it both crippled Plame’s ability to carry out any future covert operations and allowed foreign intelligence services to learn how the CIA operates by
tracing Plame’s steps and contacts in their countries.80 In addition, the leak may well have put Plame’s life in jeopardy, as well
as the lives of her friends and associates.81 In sum, the public
value of the information was minimal compared to the harm
that it caused.
However, Judith Miller never actually published this information. This is a pertinent fact because it is widely understood
within the political sphere of journalism that reporters routinely rely on off-the-record confidential disclosures as a
means of ensuring that the reporter has sufficient background
information to publish credible and accurate news.82 Thus, a
reporter’s privilege that does not absolutely protect the press’s
ability to merely obtain, as opposed to publish, information
from a confidential government-agent informant appears to be
constitutionally deficient. As Judge Tatel stated in Miller,
reporters’ interests mirror the public’s.83 Accordingly, reporters
should have the initial freedom to obtain confidential government information, and then to subsequently determine
whether it is consistent with their duty to publish that information. In other words, unless and until the reporter affirmatively reports confidential government information which
harms the public’s interest, he or she should have an absolute
privilege to gather it.
Although Miller’s case is unique, there are several recent
developments where a pure application of the proposed rule
helps to demonstrate its propriety. For example, on November
2, 2005, the Washington Post published an article that reported
that the United States government had set up secret CIA terrorist prison camps across the world in order to skirt America’s
higher standards of prisoner treatment.84 In response, the CIA
formally referred the matter to the Justice Department, suggest-

ing that a government agent may
Although Miller’s
have illegally disclosed classified
case is unique,
information to the reporter.85
There was speculation that a
there are
grand jury would eventually
several recent
issue a subpoena upon the
developments
reporter, Dana Priest, in an effort
to learn the identity of the
where a pure
reporter’s confidential source.86
application
If a grand jury were to issue a
of the proposed
subpoena to Priest, the Miller
rule helps to
decision has created a precedent
that will severely hinder the
demonstrate its
reporter’s ability to assert a testipropriety.
monial privilege.87 However,
under the proposed rule, the
reporter’s privilege would protect Priest from compelled disclosure as long as the reporter could prove that disclosure of this
information did not threaten the nation’s security.88
Similarly, in December 2005, the press reported that, in
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President
Bush authorized a secret surveillance program whereby the government has been intercepting telephone and email communications between the United States and Afghanistan.89 The controversial aspect of Bush’s surveillance program, however, lies in
the fact that the government is authorized to spy on people with
suspected links to terrorist organizations without first getting a
court’s approval. Due to this departure from traditional procedure, some security officials have questioned the legality of
Bush’s program. In an address to the American people, Bush
stated that information about his surveillance program was
“improperly provided to news organizations.”90 Thus, the government could conceivably attempt to compel disclosure of the
reporters’ confidential source via a grand jury subpoena.
If the government did issue subpoenas, the proposed rule
requires the press to comply with the subpoena unless they can
show that publishing this information related to possible government misconduct and it did not injure the nation’s security.
In this instance, it appears that the press’s reports do relate to
possible government misconduct because it is unclear whether
the President is authorized, under the Constitution, to implement this surveillance program. However, it is quite possible
that publishing this information did threaten the security of

79. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95 (emphasis added).
80. Nancy Gibbs, The Rove Problem, TIME MAGAZINE, July 25, 2005, at
25, 34.
81. Miller, 438 F.3d at 1178-79 (Tatel, J., concurring).
82. Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 229, 234 (1971). In fact, it is quite likely that the Plame
leak was an example of this practice. Gibbs, supra note 78, at 24,
25-32.
83. Miller, 397 F.3d at 1000 (Tatal, J., concurring).
84. DANA PRIEST, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH.
POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1.
85. Wolf Blitzer, (CNN television broadcast Nov. 8, 2005) available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0511/08/sitroom.04.ht

ml. This is the same preliminary action that the CIA took before
Judith Miller was eventually subpoenaed by a grand jury. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The information relates to possible government misconduct
because if the allegations are true then the government’s action
may have violated United States law. Furthermore, disclosing this
information does not appear to injure the public’s security because
the location of the prisons was not revealed.
89. David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at § 1.
90. Id. (quoting President Bush).
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our nation because it “alert[ed] our enemies and endanger[ed]
our country.”91 Thus, even if President Bush’s tactics are
unlawful, a court should compel disclosure of the reporter’s
confidential government-agent informant only if it finds that,
by publishing the information, the reporter actually hindered
the government’s ability to prevent future terrorist attacks.
Unquestionably, in these modern-day examples, the confidential information was or may have been illegally disclosed.
However, in these examples, the illegal disclosure arguably
benefited the public because it contributed to the free flow of
information about government conduct, which is required to
protect the sanctity of our self-governing process. Therefore,
in the Miller context, the scope of a reporter’s privilege directly
implements First Amendment rights and the Branzburg reasons for strictly denying such a privilege must be examined in
light of the reporter’s countervailing freedom of press.
III. CONCLUSION

The First Amendment should provide reporters with a
meaningful degree of protection from grand jury subpoenas
that seek the identity of a confidential government-agent informant. This protection is necessary in order to ensure that the
press can effectively gather and report information relating to
government misconduct. In addition, a rule that provides
reporters with a qualified privilege in the narrow context of
“illegally disclosed confidential government information”
would not conflict with either the rule or the reasoning in

91. Id. (quoting President Bush). But see Paul Farhi, N.Y. Times Held
Off Publishing Domestic-Eavesdropping Story, PHILA. INQUIRER,
December 18, 2005, at A22 (reporting that the New York Times
purposely delayed publishing this story until it “satisfied itself
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Branzburg. On the contrary, it respects Branzburg’s desire to
protect the public’s interest by promoting a grand jury’s ability
to prosecute criminal activity. However, it recognizes that
applying Branzburg in the context of Miller suppresses this precise concern because it inhibits the press’s ability to serve as
the government’s watchdog. Finally, since Branzburg the
press’s reliance on confidential government-agent informants
has significantly increased and, therefore, Branzburg’s refusal to
extend the press’s First Amendment right to gather news
should be reconsidered in the context of the Miller facts.
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NCSC/NHTSA WEBSITE ON
HANDLING DWI CASES
www.courtsanddwi.org
With the support of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
National Center for State Courts has created a
website for judges to help in handling those
who drive drunk or impaired. The site is also
intended to provide educational materials that
may be used in public-education efforts about
reducing drunk driving and the role courts
may play in that effort. The site was developed
by the National Center for State Courts with
assistance from a group of judges and judicial
educators.
The website includes several self-contained
modules, allowing visitors to move directly to
material of interest. Those modules are:
• Effects on the Community, which
includes PowerPoint slides, a self-awareness quiz, and links to other resources;
• The Court’s Role, which uses a “frequently asked questions” format to
guide visitors to video clips from judges
on the role of the courts, as well as an
overview about applying problem-solving-court principles to DUI cases;
• Adjudication Process, which provides
video clips from experienced judges
about handling these cases, as well as
links to additional resources for judges
and an educator’s guide;
• Sentencing Options, which discusses
way to achieve goals of rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and sanction, how to factor high-BAC levels into sentencing
decisions, and what some have recommended as “best practices” for DUI sentencing;
• Community Impact, which is intended
to show that the use of some of these
methods may result in better results and
an improved community.
Self-assessment tests on the effects of drunk
driving may be taken online or printed out.
Thus, they could be used in a public-education
setting with students or the general public.
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THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC OPINION
“The next president may have the opportunity to make several nominations to the
Supreme Court. How important is the appointment of Supreme Court justices in your
vote for president next year: very important, somewhat important, or not important
at all?”
.
Very
Somewhat
Not at All
Important
Important
Important
Unsure
8/7-13/07
52%
36%
11%
2%
.
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way the United States Supreme Court is handling its job?”

8/7-13/07
4/25 - 5/1/07
11/28 - 12/4/05
7/21-25/05
5/18-23/05
12/7-12/04
2/26 - 3/3/03

Approve
45%
58%
50%
50%
44%
50%
56%

Disapprove
37%
27%
32%
39%
39%
33%
27%

Unsure
17%
15%
17%
11%
17%
17%
16%

“Do you think the United States Supreme Court is moving in the right direction or
the wrong direction?”

8/7-13/07

Right Direction
39%

Wrong Direction
37%

Unsure
25%

“Do you think the Supreme Court is too liberal, too conservative, or about right?”
.
Too Liberal
Too Conservative
About Right
Unsure
8/7-13/07
20%
29%
37%
13%
“Is your opinion of Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts favorable, unfavorable,
mixed or haven’t you heard enough about him?”
.
Favorable
Unfavorable
Mixed
Haven’t Heard
8/7-13/07
21%
9%
21%
49%
.
“Which comes closer to your point of view? (A) In making decisions, the Supreme
Court should only consider the original intentions of the authors of the constitution.
(B) In making decisions, the Supreme Court should consider changing times and current realities in applying the principles of the Constitution.”
.
Original Intentions
Current Realities
Unsure
8/7-13/07
43%
48%
9%
7/21-25/05
44%
50%
6%
5/18-23/05
42%
51%
8%
54%
7%
39%
2/26 - 3/3/03 Adults
Source: Quinnipiac University Poll. N=1,545 registered voters nationwide for survey of
Aug. 7-13, 2007; margin of error ± 2.5%, as reported at The Polling Report (www.polling
report.com/Court.htm).

